THE NEW ENCIRCLEMENT OF INDIA’S MARITIME BASTION: US–PAKISTAN MOVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND MALDIVES’ POTENTIAL ROLE AS A ‘LILY PAD’🧰

For centuries, North India has witnessed invasions, land wars, and large-scale civilizational contests―from Panipat to Plassey to 1947, 1965, 1971 and the Kargil conflict of 1999. But today’s strategic reality presents a stark paradigm shift: India’s next major confrontation will not unfold on land, but across the vast maritime expanse that surrounds the Indian peninsula. For the first time in modern history, India’s southern flank―traditionally secure, uncontested, and protected by the natural moat of the Indian Ocean―is showing signs of a coordinated, multilayered maritime encirclement. This is not accidental, nor is it episodic.

It is systematic, designed, and executed through a carefully-aligned set of actors: the United States, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, with China invisibly influencing the periphery. Each movement in the last twelve months in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has not merely been a stand-alone incident; collectively, they represent the formation of a new geopolitical lattice whose pressure point is the Indian Navy, and whose fulcrum rests on the vulnerabilities of India’s maritime sphere―Arabian Sea, Lakshadweep–Minicoy zone, southern peninsula, Bay of Bengal, and the waters around Andaman & Nicobar.

The emerging scenario took a decisive turn on 24 October 2025, with the highly symbolic and deeply strategic visit of Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, to the Maldives. During this visit, General Mirza met Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, Defence Minister Mohamed Ghassan Maumoon, and Chief of Defence Forces Major General Ibrahim Hilmy.

These meetings were not ceremonial gestures but part of a broader recalibration wherein Maldives―historically guided by India-first maritime security orientation―has shifted towards a Pakistan-supported, Turkey-equipped, and increasingly US-engaged security posture. The roots of this change extend back to February 2025, when General Hilmy visited Pakistan and held detailed defence cooperation discussions with Pakistan Army Field Marshal Asim Munir. Taken together, these exchanges reveal a clear strategic blueprint: Pakistan is inserting itself into Maldives’ defence architecture, and the Muizzu administration is opening every door for it.

The most significant dimension of General Mirza’s visit was not diplomatic, but naval: PNS Saif, a Pakistani Navy warship, docked in Maldives and carried out a Passage Exercise (PASSEX) with the Maldives Coast Guard. At first glance, a PASSEX may appear as a routine interoperability drill. But in maritime strategy, PASSEX exercises are a litmus test―they reveal influence, access, and the degree to which one navy is embedding itself into another nation’s maritime decision space. Mission Commander Commodore Md Zeshan Nabi Sheikh’s multiple engagements with Maldivian defence leadership confirm Pakistan’s intent to shape Maldivian coastal surveillance patterns, naval communication protocols, and maritime threat-assessment doctrines. For a country as geographically small and strategically exposed as Maldives, the navy it cooperates with essentially becomes the navy that protects―and in some cases, directs―its maritime behaviour. If that navy is Pakistan’s, the implications for India’s southern flank are immediate and severe.

The deeper strategic angle lies in the Maldives–Pakistan–Turkey axis, which has matured rapidly since 2023. Under President Muizzu, Maldives openly supported Pakistan on the Kashmir debate at the UN and OIC. Pakistan reciprocated by backing Maldives’ maritime claims in international forums. Beyond diplomatic barter, the axis is driven by Turkey’s role as a defence supplier: in 2024 Maldives procured Bayraktar TB2 and Anka drones, capable of carrying 150 kg payloads across four hardpoints, operating at high altitudes with precision strike capabilities. The revelation that Maldives tested a modified Bayraktar variant with a 1000 km operational range is strategically explosive. A drone with such endurance places entire South Indian coastline―Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu―along with Lakshadweep Islands―well within ISR strike envelope if Maldives were to be politically or militarily leveraged by Pakistan or Turkey.

The munitions list that Bayraktar platforms can carry―MAM-L, MAM-C, Roketsan guided munitions―and their maritime ISR capabilities raise a fundamental question:

Why does a nation with no external threats require advanced armed drones with such strike range?

The only logical conclusion is that these drones enhance the surveillance footprint of Pakistan and Turkey in the central Indian Ocean, forming the early scaffolding of a broader encirclement pattern.

Parallel to this, Sri Lanka is emerging as an even more critical node in the new maritime geometry. Just three days before the Maldives developments, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a defence MOU that pushes South Asia into a new security configuration. The agreement―signed by US Ambassador Julie Chung, Brigadier General Trenton Gibson, and Sri Lankan Defence Secretary AVM Sampath Thuyacontha―lays the groundwork for joint military activities beginning mid-2026. This includes coordination with the Montana National Guard and US Coast Guard District 13, institutions that specialize in maritime interdiction, naval surveillance, and littoral defence. While Sri Lanka’s official narrative emphasizes capacity building, the strategic undercurrent is unmistakable: this MOU gives the United States significant operational access to waters barely a few hundred kilometres off India’s southern coast.

For Washington, Sri Lanka is a surveillance vantage point; for Colombo, it is a mechanism for defence modernization; but for India, it represents a slow erosion of its maritime buffer. This is aggravated by Sri Lanka’s existing firepower ecosystem: Chinese-supplied Type-81 based 122mm MBRL systems, indigenous compatible rockets, and Gabriel Mk-II anti-ship missiles, operational on Sa’ar 4-class missile boats. Though Sri Lanka alone cannot challenge India, a Sri Lankan military synchronized with US maritime logistics and Pakistani/Turkish drone surveillance would form a multi-layered pressure arc on India’s southern sea lanes.

The US commitment to supply MH-60R Seahawk anti-submarine warfare helicopters by 2027 significantly alters the equation. Seahawks are among the world’s most advanced ASW platforms, equipped with dipping sonar, sonobuoy deployment systems, and torpedoes capable of countering advanced submarines―including those of the Indian Navy. Combined with the potential integration of MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems capable of housing Tomahawk-class long-range missiles, Sri Lanka could transform into a southern maritime surveillance hub with deep strike capabilities―something that would directly affect India’s strategic posture in the Indian Ocean.

On the Pakistani supply front, Colombo is set to receive Burraq UCAVs, Anza Mk-III MANPADS, Bakhtar-Shikan ATGMs, and possibly JF-17 Thunders. The official explanation that Sri Lanka requires ATGMs for border security is implausible. The real incentive is Pakistan’s desire to build a supply-chain ecosystem in Sri Lanka that integrates its military hardware with Sri Lanka’s defence planning―much like China did during the Eelam wars. This triangulation―US for strategic access, Pakistan for military embedding, China for weapons legacy―places India in a highly complex maritime neighbourhood.

The broader strategic background is incomplete without revisiting 1971. During the Bangladesh Liberation War, India neutralized Pakistan’s F-86 Sabres to the extent that several crashed aircraft were seen dangling from treetops in Sirsa (Haryana) and Garibpur (West Bengal). When USS Enterprise-led Task Force 74 attempted to intimidate India in the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Navy maintained a firm maritime stand, preventing the fleet from altering the war’s outcome. Today, 53 years later, the first Pakistani naval vessel has docked in Bangladesh’s Chittagong―symbolizing a return of Pakistani naval presence to the eastern maritime theatre.

The US and Pakistan now share a mutual interest in the Indian Ocean:

to limit, pressure, or strategically constrain the Indian Navy―thereby influencing India’s broader geopolitical autonomy.

For the US, the Indian Ocean contains 33% of global maritime trade routes and enormous hydrocarbon reserves in the Bay of Bengal. For Pakistan, maritime influence is its only viable pathway to offset India’s continental superiority. Together, their alignment in the IOR is not an alliance per se, but a convergence driven by geopolitical arithmetic.

This brings us to the critical question:

Will Maldives become a ‘Lily Pad’?

A Lily Pad base―small, agile, quickly operational military nodes―enables rapid drone launches, ASW flights, special forces deployment, and ISR operations. If Maldives’ runways, ports, and drone bays become remotely accessible to Pakistan, Turkey, or the United States, India’s southern maritime flank will face persistent pressure. ISR drones operating from Maldives can track Indian naval movements, submarine transit routes, and even India’s carrier battle groups.

India’s maritime security today is not simply about naval vessels but about satellite surveillance, anti-submarine grids, island-based radar chains, blue-water logistics and multilateral seabed intelligence. The attempt to stretch India across multiple points―Maldives in the southwest, Sri Lanka in the south, Pakistan in the west, and symbolic presence in Bangladesh in the east―aims to dilute India’s freedom of action in its own maritime backyard.

India now faces the emergence of a new maritime containment arc, not declared but forming silently. It represents a strategic evolution in the geopolitics of Asia―one where the battlefields will not be plains or mountains but open seas; where aircraft carriers, submarines, drones, floating logistics hubs, and maritime chokepoints will decide the balance of power.

The conflict that once centered around North India’s plains is migrating southwards―towards the vast maritime expanse that defines India’s geography and national destiny. History is knocking again, but this time not from the northwest passes―

it is approaching from the deep waters of the Indian Ocean.

हिंदी अनुवाद

भारतीय इतिहास में उत्तरी मैदानों ने अनगिनत युद्धों का बोझ झेला है―पानीपत के तीन निर्णायक युद्ध, प्लासी से लेकर बक्सर तक, और फिर 1947, 1965, 1971 तथा 1999 के संघर्ष। परंतु वर्तमान भू-राजनीतिक परिदृश्य का सबसे चिंताजनक पहलू यह है कि अब भारत की शक्ति-परीक्षा भूमि पर नहीं, बल्कि समुद्र पर होने जा रही है। भारतीय प्रायद्वीप, जो भारतीय नौसेना की सामरिक रीढ़ है, आज पहली बार एक संगठित, बहुआयामी और उद्देश्यपूर्ण घेराबंदी के संकेत दे रहा है। यह घेराबंदी आकस्मिक नहीं, बल्कि US–Pakistan–Turkey–Maldives–Sri Lanka के उभरते हुए धुरी समूह द्वारा योजनाबद्ध तरीके से आकार ले रही है। पिछले एक वर्ष में जो गतिविधियाँ हिंद महासागर क्षेत्र (IOR) में हुई हैं, वे केवल घटनाएँ नहीं, बल्कि आने वाले दशकों की सामरिक रेखाएँ हैं―रेखाएँ, जिनका केंद्र भारतीय नौसेना है और जिनका विस्तार मालदीव, श्रीलंका, अरब सागर, बंगाल की खाड़ी और अंडमान सागर तक है। भारत की समुद्री शक्ति पर आघात करने के लिए एक नया ‘मरीटाइम कारिडोर’ आकार ले रहा है, जिसमें मालदीव संभवतः एक Lily Pad, यानी अग्रिम ASW/ISR (Anti-Submarine Warfare / Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) प्लेटफॉर्म के रूप में उभर सकता है। इसे समझने के लिए घटनाओं की गहरी माइक्रो-स्टडी आवश्यक है।

24 अक्टूबर 2025 को पाकिस्तान के CJCSC, जनरल साहिर शामशाद मिर्ज़ा की मालदीव यात्रा दक्षिण एशिया की सामरिक भू-राजनीति में एक नया मोड़ थी। मालदीव, जिसे परंपरागत रूप से भारत-प्रथम सुरक्षा नीति का पालनकर्ता माना जाता था, अब खुले तौर पर पाकिस्तान के साथ रक्षा सहयोग बढ़ाने की दिशा में आगे बढ़ चुका है। मिर्ज़ा की मुलाकातें―राष्ट्रपति मोहम्मद मुयीज्जू, रक्षा मंत्री मोहम्मद घस्सान मऊमून, और चीफ़ ऑफ़ डिफ़ेन्स फोर्सेज़ मेजर जनरल इब्राहीम हिल्मी से―महज़ शिष्टाचार नहीं थीं। फरवरी 2025 में जनरल हिल्मी पहले ही पाकिस्तान जाकर फ़ील्ड मार्शल असीम मुनीर से रक्षा-सहयोग पर विस्तृत वार्ता कर चुके थे। इन यात्राओं का पैटर्न बिल्कुल स्पष्ट है―पाकिस्तान मालदीव की सैन्य संरचना को अपने हितों के अनुरूप ढाल रहा है और मुयीज्जू शासन इसके लिए दरवाज़े पूरी तरह खोल चुका है।

इस यात्रा का सबसे रणनीतिक पहलू था पाकिस्तानी नौसेना के युद्धपोत PNS Saif का मालदीव पहुंचना और वहाँ की कोस्ट गार्ड के साथ PASSEX करना। यह अभ्यास सतही तौर पर तकनीकी था, लेकिन इसके भीतर पाकिस्तान का वास्तविक उद्देश्य छिपा है―मालदीव की तटीय सुरक्षा पर प्रभाव स्थापित करना। मिशन कमांडर कमोडोर ज़ेशान नबी शेख की लगातार मीटिंग्स और कोऑर्डिनेशन गतिविधियाँ इस बात का संकेत हैं कि पाकिस्तान मालदीव की समुद्री निगरानी, इंटरसेप्शन क्षमताओं और समुद्री निर्णय-निर्धारण में प्रत्यक्ष प्रभाव स्थापित करना चाहता है। दक्षिणी हिंद महासागर में यदि कोई छोटा राष्ट्र पाकिस्तान जैसे एक प्रॉक्सी पार्टनर के नियंत्रण में आ जाए, तो यह भारत के लिए चिंता का विषय नहीं, बल्कि सीधा खतरा बन जाता है, क्योंकि किसी भी देश की नौसेना की सबसे महत्वपूर्ण ताकत है―उसका अप्रभावित समुद्री विस्तार।

मालदीव–पाकिस्तान–तुर्की का उभरता त्रिकोण पिछले दो वर्षों में तेजी से सक्रिय हुआ है। मुयीज्जू सरकार ने संयुक्त राष्ट्र और OIC में पाकिस्तान के कश्मीर नैरेटिव का समर्थन किया है। वहीं पाकिस्तान ने मालदीव के समुद्री दावों को अंतरराष्ट्रीय मंचों पर समर्थन देकर राजनीतिक quid-pro-quo संबंध को मजबूत किया है। तुर्की की भूमिका इस त्रिकोण में तकनीकी और सामरिक है―2024 में मालदीव ने Bayraktar TB2 और Anka ड्रोन खरीदे, जो 150 किलोग्राम तक के हथियार लेकर 27,000 फीट तक उड़ान भर सकते हैं। इससे भी बड़ा खतरा वह जानकारी है कि मालदीव ने 1000 किमी रेंज वाले मॉडिफाइड Bayraktar का परीक्षण किया, जिससे पूरा दक्षिणी भारत―केरल, कर्नाटक, तमिलनाडु, लक्षद्वीप―दूरी के भीतर आ जाता है। Bayraktar द्वारा उठाए जाने वाले हथियारों की सूची―MAM-L, MAM-C, रोकेटसन गाइडेड रॉकेट―स्पष्ट रूप से संकेत देती है कि मालदीव की सीमित सुरक्षा जरूरतें इतनी उन्नत मारक क्षमता नहीं मांगतीं। इसका सीधा मतलब है: इन प्रणालियों का उपयोग ISR (खुफिया निगरानी), समुद्री ट्रैकिंग और आवश्यकता पड़ने पर भारत की समुद्री गतिविधियों पर प्रेशर-बिल्डिंग के लिए किया जा सकता है।

अब नज़र डालें श्रीलंका पर, जहाँ तीन दिन पहले अमेरिका और श्रीलंका ने एक अत्यंत महत्वपूर्ण रक्षा MOU पर हस्ताक्षर किए। यह MOU महज़ प्रशिक्षण-सहयोग का दस्तावेज़ नहीं, बल्कि एक ढांचा है जो 2026 के मध्य से संयुक्त समुद्री क्रियाकलापों को सक्षम करेगा। अमेरिकी राजदूत जूली चुंग, ब्रिगेडियर जनरल ट्रेंटन गिब्सन और श्रीलंका के रक्षा सचिव AVM संपथ थुयाकोंथा द्वारा हस्ताक्षरित यह समझौता अमेरिका को हिंद महासागर के दक्षिणी प्रवेशद्वार तक सीधी पहुँच देता है। इसमें US Coast Guard District-13 और Montana National Guard जैसे उच्चस्तरीय संस्थान शामिल हैं। इस MOU से दो चीज़ें स्पष्ट होती हैं―पहली, श्रीलंका की सेना अब अमेरिका के साथ तकनीकी, सामरिक और खुफिया क्षेत्रों में गहराई से जुड़ने को तैयार है; दूसरी, यह समझौता भारत के लिए संभावित सर्विलांस–इंटेंसिफिकेशन का संकेत है, क्योंकि इससे अमेरिकी नौसैनिक और खुफिया गतिविधियाँ हिंद महासागर में और सक्रिय होंगी।

श्रीलंका का हथियार-संसाधन भी पिछले वर्षों में बहुत बदल गया है। चीन ने उसे Type-81 आधारित 122mm MBRL सिस्टम दिए हैं, जो स्थानीय गोला-बारूद के साथ संगत हैं। इसके अलावा, Gabriel Mk-II एंटी-शिप मिसाइलें―जो Sa’ar-4 वर्ग की मिसाइल बोट्स पर तैनात हैं―भारतीय नौसेना के पनडुब्बी मार्गों, समुद्री व्यापारिक मार्गों और ASW प्लेटफॉर्म्स के लिए संभावित खतरे पैदा करती हैं। श्रीलंका की यह क्षमता स्वतंत्र रूप से भारत को चुनौती नहीं दे सकती, लेकिन यदि यह क्षमता अमेरिका और पाकिस्तान समर्थित समुद्री नेटवर्क का हिस्सा बन जाए, तो भारतीय नौसेना के दक्षिणी समुद्री गलियारे में बहुस्तरीय खतरा उत्पन्न हो जाएगा।

अमेरिका 2027 तक श्रीलंका को MH-60R Seahawk हेलीकॉप्टर दे रहा है, जो दुनिया का सबसे उन्नत ASW प्लेटफॉर्म है। Seahawk की क्षमताएँ―डिपिंग सोनार, सोनाबॉय स्कैन, टॉरपीडो―स्पष्ट रूप से इन्हें हिंद महासागर में पनडुब्बी-शिकार का हवाई हथियार बनाती हैं। इसी के साथ MK-41 VLS मॉड्यूल्स का एकीकरण श्रीलंका की नौसेना को Tomahawk जैसी लंबी दूरियों तक मार करने वाली मिसाइलों को अपनाने का रास्ता खोल सकता है। 2027 तक श्रीलंका की समुद्री क्षमताएँ पूरी तरह बदल चुकी होंगी, और यह बदलाव भारत के दक्षिणी नौसैनिक गलियारों पर प्रत्यक्ष प्रभाव डालेगा।

अब ध्यान पाकिस्तान की संभावित आपूर्ति पर दें―Burraq UCAV, Anza-III MANPADS, Bakhtar-Shikan ATGM और JF-17 Thunder। श्रीलंका ATGM का उपयोग कहाँ करेगा? आधिकारिक तर्क यह है कि यह “बॉर्डर सुरक्षा” और “स्थलीय रक्षा” के लिए है, लेकिन अधोरेखित वास्तविकता यह है कि पाकिस्तान श्रीलंका की सेना को अपने हथियार-इकोसिस्टम में जोड़ रहा है। जैसे 1980–90 के दशक में श्रीलंका LTTE के विरुद्ध चीन और पाकिस्तान आधारित हथियारों पर निर्भर था, उसी तरह अब वह US + China + Pakistan का मिश्रित, बहु-ध्रुवीय सैन्य-आधारित समर्थन प्राप्त कर रहा है, जो भारतीय सुरक्षा गणित को और जटिल बनाता है।

इतिहास स्वयं को दोहरा रहा है, हालांकि स्वरूप बदल गया है। 1971 में अमेरिका का Task Force 74 जब बंगाल की खाड़ी में प्रवेश करने की तैयारी में था, तब भारतीय नौसेना ने निर्णायक रूप से उसे रोक दिया था। यह वह समय था जब भारतीय वायुसेना ने पाकिस्तान के F-86 Sabre जेट्स को धराशायी किया था―कुछ तो पेड़ों पर लटके मिले थे, जैसे सिरसा (हरियाणा) और गारिबपुर (पश्चिम बंगाल) में। आज 53 वर्षों बाद पहली बार पाकिस्तान की नौसेना का जहाज बांग्लादेश के चिटगाँग में पहुँचा है। यह प्रतीकात्मक घटना नहीं―बल्कि संकेत है कि बंगाल की खाड़ी में पाकिस्तान की उपस्थिति अब एक नो-एपिसोडिक वास्तविकता बनने जा रही है।

अब US और Pakistan दोनों का सामरिक हित एक ही दिशा में है―भारतीय नौसेना को उसके स्वयं के क्षेत्रीय प्रभाव-क्षेत्र, विशेषकर IOR में, प्रतिस्पर्धा में लाना और उसके सप्लाई चेन, समुद्री निगरानी क्षमताओं, पनडुब्बी मार्गों और समुद्री व्यापार के निर्बाध प्रवाह को बाधित करना। अमेरिका का हित है 33% विश्व व्यापार के समुद्री मार्ग और बंगाल की खाड़ी के अत्यंत समृद्ध गैस भंडारों पर नियंत्रण; पाकिस्तान का हित है भारत की समुद्री शक्ति को कमजोर करके स्वयं को हिंद महासागर में एक प्रमुख खिलाड़ी के रूप में स्थापित करना।

यहाँ मुख्य प्रश्न यह उठता है: क्या मालदीव एक Lily Pad बनने जा रहा है? इस प्रश्न का उत्तर धीरे-धीरे ‘हाँ’ में बदलता जा रहा है। Lily Pad मॉडल का अर्थ है―छोटे, लचीले, त्वरित-प्रतिक्रिया वाले सैन्य ठिकाने, जहाँ से ASW ड्रोन, ISR विमान, विशेष बल, समुद्री निगरानी प्रणाली और नौसैनिक प्रयास संचालित किए जा सकें। यदि मालदीव का भूभाग, एयरस्ट्रिप्स, ड्रोन डॉकिंग प्वाइंट्स और समुद्री बेस पाकिस्तान या अमेरिका की ‘रिमोट ऑपरेशन क्षमता’ के लिए खुल जाते हैं, तो यह भारत के दक्षिणी तट के ठीक सामने सामरिक दबाव-क्षेत्र बन जाएगा।

भारत की समुद्री सुरक्षा का स्वास्थ्य अब केवल नाविक शक्ति पर निर्भर नहीं―बल्कि उपग्रह निगरानी, पनडुब्बी गलियारों, द्वीपीय सहयोग, तटीय रडार नेटवर्क और मल्टी-डोमेन कोऑर्डिनेशन पर भी निर्भर करता है। और इसी क्षेत्र में भारत पर दबाव बनाने की कोशिश की जा रही है। पश्चिम में पाकिस्तान―दक्षिण में श्रीलंका―दक्षिण-पश्चिम में मालदीव―और पूर्व में बांग्लादेश तक पाकिस्तान की प्रतीकात्मक पहुँच―ये सभी मिलकर एक नया समुद्री रणनीतिक त्रिकोण बना रहे हैं।

भारत को इस नए परिदृश्य का सामना अत्यंत सावधानी और वैज्ञानिक रणनीति से करना होगा, क्योंकि यह लड़ाई बमों या फाइटर जेट्स की नहीं―बल्कि समुद्री लॉजिस्टिक्स, इंटेलिजेंस वॉरफेयर और सप्लाई चेन कंट्रोल की है। हिंद महासागर में जो नियंत्रण करेगा, वही एशिया की अर्थव्यवस्था पर प्रभाव डालेगा। आने वाले दशक में भारत की नौसेना को अपनी भूमिका भूमि आधारित संघर्ष से कहीं अधिक महत्वपूर्ण मिलेगी।

यह लड़ाई भारत के उत्तर में नहीं, बल्कि समुद्री प्रायद्वीप के चारों ओर लड़ी जाएगी―जहाँ भारत को एक-एक द्वीप, एक-एक समुद्री मार्ग और एक-एक साझेदारी नए सिरे से देखनी होगी। अमेरिका और पाकिस्तान की संयुक्त समुद्री रणनीति भविष्य के बड़े भू-राजनीतिक खेल की नींव है―और इसका केंद्र हिंद महासागर है। भारत को यह समझना होगा कि इतिहास ने एक बार फिर उसके द्वार पर युद्ध खड़ा कर दिया है―बस इस बार युद्धभूमि भूमि नहीं, बल्कि समुद्र है।

REFERENCES

1. Pakistan-Maldives Military Cooperation

• “CJCSC holds meetings with Maldivian civil-military leadership” ― Radio Pakistan.

• “CJCSC holds key meetings in Maldives” ― Samaa TV.

• “Pakistan, Maldives to boost military cooperation amid shifting regional dynamics” ― Arab News.

• “Gen Sahir Shamshad Mirza holds major defence talks in Maldives” ― Daily Ausaf.

2. Pakistan Navy Ship PNS Saif Visit / PASSEX

• Video from Pakistan Navy / ISPR showing PNS Saif in Maldives and conducting PASSEX: ISPR YouTube channel.

• Background on PNS Saif (frigate) specifications: Wikipedia.

3. Maldives Drones / Bayraktar TB2

• “Maldives starts flying Turkish drones for maritime surveillance” ― Defense News.

• “Maldives acquires Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey” ― The Defense Post.

• “Maldives receives Turkish Bayraktar TB2 Drones” ― Bay of Bengal Post.

• Technical info on the Bayraktar TB2 UCAV: Wikipedia.

• Info about the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF) Air Corps (that received TB2): Wikipedia on MNDF Air Corps.

4. US–Sri Lanka Defence MOU

• “U.S. and Sri Lanka Formalize Security Cooperation: Montana National Guard Signs MOU …” ― DVIDS Hub (US DoD news).

• “Sri Lanka and U.S. Cement Defence Partnership with Landmark MOU Signing” ― Ceylon Digest.

• “US and SL sign major defence MoU” ― Sri Lanka Mirror.

• “US and Sri Lanka sign historic defense agreement” ― Colombo Gazette.

• For context, State Partnership Program (SPP) with US National Guard: Wikipedia.

5. Sri Lanka Naval / Maritime Strategy

• “Current Establishment and Core Principles of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy” ― Sri Lanka Navy Journal.

EVIDENCE