HAFIZ SAEED’S SHADOW OVER BANGLADESH:PAKISTAN EASTERN JIHAD

Shri tejas s.dodia

Kautilya has given the Mandal Siddhant, which is concentric circles showing different mandals. It is based on the view that neighbours are natural enemies. Since land is the source of material welfare, neighbours aim to acquire the same piece of land…to achieve that aim, Kautilya has given a strategy of SHADGUNYA SIDDHANT (six-fold policy), which is to be used as per the situation.

A shadow is moving quietly and deliberately across the map of South Asia, one whose outlines are at once old and newly drawn ― old because it traces networks, ideologies and grudges that have persisted for decades; new because it seeks to exploit an emergent political opening in Bangladesh and an increasingly interconnected web of Salafi-jihadist actors to recalibrate pressure points on India’s eastern flank. Reports in Indian and international media in late October 2025 identified Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer ― a long-known figure in Pakistan’s Ahl-e-Hadith / Salafi circles and the general secretary of Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith ― as having arrived in Dhaka on October 25 and then moving through a string of districts that hug the India–Bangladesh border, including Rajshahi, Chapainawabganj, Rangpur, Lalmonirhat and Nilphamari, delivering blistering sermons and meeting local clerics and cadres; those reports say his presence and the tone of his speeches have alarmed security analysts in India who see in them explicit recruitment and radicalizing intent rather than mere religious outreach.

These accounts, drawn from on-the-ground reporting, portray Zaheer as more than a travelling scholar: they place him as a long-time associate of Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and someone ideologically and socially tied into networks that the Indian state has long associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba and its political-religious affiliates; the significance of this is not merely associative―if a well-connected Pakistani Salafi figure uses public platforms in Bangladesh’s border districts to preach martyrdom, to vilify Hindus and secular politics, and to congratulate or promise eventual change in contested territories like Kashmir, the impact will be felt across communities that straddle porous borders and among networks that can act as force multipliers for insurgent designs or communal polarization.

The chronology of Zaheer’s trip is unnerving for two reasons: the route ― a deliberate set of stops along frontier districts that have histories of cross-border smuggling, seasonal migration, and fragile law-and-order environments ― and the timing, which comes after a profound political shock in Dhaka that created an opening for actors who had previously been pushed to the margins.

In August 2024, Sheikh Hasina’s ouster and the arrival of an interim regime under Muhammad Yunus, according to several regional analysts and local press, produced an immediate and palpable recalibration in Bangladesh’s domestic political space; institutions that previously applied pressure on extremist groups were weakened or re-tasked, and political polarization opened pockets where hardened ideological cadres found breathing space. Into that quieter, more chaotic political air stepped visitors from across the border and beyond ― some preaching, others networking ― and the concern from New Delhi is that Pakistan’s deep state and its allied non-state proxies, historically focused on the Jammu & Kashmir theatre, are experimenting with a different axis: an eastern front that aims to radicalize, infiltrate, and ― if conditions permit ― ignite localized unrest that can reverberate into India’s northeast.

This is not speculative geopolitics so much as a pattern visible in recent events and historical analogues: Pakistan’s use of proxy groups and religious networks to project power into India is well documented; the novelty here is geographic reorientation and method. The eastern pivot relies less on direct armed infiltration across the Line of Control and more on fungible assets ― ideologues who can catalyse local grievances into militancy, porous smuggling routes that can move people and materials surreptitiously, and diasporic or fugitive preachers whose reputations travel faster than borders. Evidence of these shifting tactics appears in the public record of arrests and counterterror operations in the wider Bengal region in 2025, revealing Pakistan-trained operatives and cells with cross-border linkages; such cases underscore the risk that ideological diffusion ― sermons, conferences, madrasa networks, charismatic personalities ― can translate into organizational recruitment and logistical support on the ground. Zaheer’s public exhortations ― calling for sacrifice, vilifying secular and liberal forces, celebrating an imagined future for Kashmir, and advocating pan-regional Islamic unity ― resonate in a social ecology where class grievance, political disaffection, unemployment, and identity anxiety create fertile ground for narratives that turn perceived humiliation into a theological call to action.

That rhetorical audit matters because contemporary jihadist movements are as much media and identity projects as they are kinetic ones; when a figure with transnational ties publicly frames territorial disputes in cosmic terms and promises eventual reversal of political realities, it hardens worldviews and lowers thresholds for recruitment. Compounding the danger is the pattern of facilitation: reports note that Zaheer was received by local figures aligned with Ahl-e-Hadith networks and travelled with clerics who maintain influence in border mosques and seminaries ― entities that, in the past, have been implicated in both charitable and extremist activities.

Where state presence is thin and community gatekeepers are strong, such gatekeepers can become conduits for radical messaging and for the quieter, more dangerous business of normalization: sermons that move from theological debate to political injunctions; charitable networks that slide from welfare into patronage for radical-inclined madrassas; and social media amplification that gives local sermons global reach. Another vector of concern is the formation of ideological chains across actors: reports and social-media documentation from 2024–2025 indicate interactions among the likes of Hafiz Saeed’s circle, Zaheer’s institutional networks, and other transnational preachers whose narratives converge on Salafi interpretations and on an adversarial posture toward pluralist societies.

When high-profile fugitives or exiled preachers ― figures like Zakir Naik, who remain polarizing and who attract large followings ― meet or are reported to be in dialogue with regional hardliners, that enables a propaganda architecture with multiple nodes: preaching tours, online lectures, conference circuits, and the textual distribution of sermons that can be re-broadcast as recruitment content. The structural appeal of such a network is that it allows for plausible deniability; what looks like a theological exchange on paper becomes, in practice, a coordination mechanism that transmits tactics, talking points, and legitimacy to actors operating in sensitive borderlands.

Pakistan’s strategic logic in cultivating an eastern axis is cynical but coherent from a power-politics view: if the western pressure point (Kashmir) is harder to operationalize because of intensive Indian security measures and international scrutiny, then fomenting instability along the porous India–Bangladesh frontier achieves several objectives at lower cost. It can force India to divide attention and resources, it can inflame communal tensions that produce political crises in recipient states, and it can create pockets of long-term instability that undermine economic development and state legitimacy among frontier populations. Equally, it exploits a paradox: India’s northeastern states ― Assam, Tripura, West Bengal’s northern districts, and West Bengal’s maritime and land approaches ― are simultaneously economically linked to Bangladesh and socially intertwined with cross-border kinship networks; this connectivity, intended to be a source of resilience and trade, can sadly become a vulnerability if external actors weaponize identity and grievance.

The historical parallels are instructive: the use of civilian and non-state envelopments for insurgent advantage was visible in South Asia’s past ― both in the mujahideen era and in later proxy conflicts ― and the new eastern script borrows from those lessons while adjusting methods to the 21st-century reality of social media, freer cross-border movement in certain seasons, and more decentralized radical ecosystems. Bangladesh’s internal politics and institutional choices will therefore determine much of how this episode evolves. If the interim government continues to send mixed signals ― prosecutorial in some instances, permissive in others, and largely silent about high-profile visitors who preach incendiary messages ― it creates a gray zone where extremists can operate with impunity or, worse, with indirect protection. Conversely, visible, decisive action by Dhaka to investigate, to monitor visiting clerics, and to pursue legal remedies against incitement could close the space that foreign actors seek to exploit; yet political costs ― domestic backlash from conservative constituencies, international diplomatic balancing, and the turbulence of transitional governance ― complicate straightforward policy choices. From New Delhi’s perspective, the immediate policy imperative is to calibrate deterrence and diplomacy: to push for cooperative intelligence sharing with Dhaka, to harden border management in communities where radical messaging has gained a foothold, and to engage in subtle but sustained counter-narrative campaigns that delegitimise violent interpretations of faith while offering alternative pathways for young people.

India’s security agencies have reportedly increased vigilance in border districts and have been tracking itineraries and sermons; arrests and counterterror operations in Bengal in 2025 reflect a proactive posture that seeks to interdict cells before they can coordinate attacks. But policing alone cannot win hearts and minds, and heavy-handed security responses in ethnically mixed or economically fragile districts risk alienating local populations and inadvertently boosting recruiter narratives that paint state action as persecution.

The humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions are therefore central: long-term resilience against radicalization requires investment in education, credible local governance, job creation, and the strengthening of community institutions that can inoculate young people against apocalyptic narratives. In this sense, a comprehensive approach should marry kinetic security measures with soft-power interventions ― scholarships, local religious leadership engagement, economic development programmes targeted to border districts, and public diplomacy to show that pluralism delivers better material outcomes than radical promises of glory and martyrdom. Geopolitically, the Zaheer episode underscores how non-state and quasi-state actors are now key instruments in the larger strategic competition between India and Pakistan; their operations complicate standard interstate diplomacy because they provide plausible deniability for origin states and because they operate in the diffuse spaces between domestic law, cross-border communities, and transnational ideologies.

The risk for escalation is real: if a cross-border actor successfully reconstitutes logistical linkages and if a triggered local cell carries out violence on Indian soil, the political pressure on New Delhi to respond forcefully could be immense, and such a response in turn could cascade into tit-for-tat escalation across the border.

That dangerous spiral is what makes prevention ― through intelligence, diplomacy, and local resilience-building ― the singular priority. It is also crucial to recognise the contest of narratives being waged: the radical actors seek to recast a political dispute into a metaphysical war, inviting moral absolutism and refusing the messy compromises that politics requires. Countering that requires a different rhetorical strategy: one that acknowledges genuine grievances in marginalised communities, offers viable pathways for expression and redress, and dismantles the theological and moral claims that terrorists use to justify violence. Scholarly work on radicalization emphasises the role of identity, perceived injustice, group dynamics, and religious authority; inoculation therefore entails strengthening pluralistic religious discourses and empowering moderate clergy who reject violence ― a long and painstaking task, but a necessary one.

The role of regional partners and multilateral institutions also matters. Bangladesh is not merely a buffer state; it is a sovereign actor with its own political trajectory. International partners concerned with regional stability, including the United Nations and ASEAN observers, could offer platforms for technical assistance on countering violent extremism: sharing best practices around madrasa regulation that respects religious freedom while cracking down on hate speech; helping design community-centred intervention programmes; and supporting independent media to ensure balanced reporting that does not amplify extremist rhetoric.

From a legal standpoint, Dhaka’s obligations under international counterterrorism frameworks require it to investigate and curtail activities that incite violence or materially support terrorism; the opacity surrounding visits like Zaheer’s creates a credibility gap that can be exploited by malign actors and that erodes regional cooperation. At the same time, it is worth underlining the dangers of blanket or sectarian policies: measures that stigmatize entire communities or that conflate legitimate religious expression with violent extremism risk deepening the very fissures extremists exploit, and therefore must be avoided.

A sombre historical lesson is that jihadist networks have often relied on local grievances to seed recruitment, only later to impose an external organisational logic that is far less forgiving of dissent within communities. Recognising that, policy responses should amplify community agency and avoid externalising the problem as merely a cross-border “security” issue; instead, treat it as a multi-dimensional social and political challenge. Analysts must also keep an eye on the tactical evolution of these networks. The shift from overt military incursions to hybrid strategies ― spiritual leaders who provide ideological cover, diasporic preachers who supply charismatic legitimacy, and local grassroots cells that execute low-cost, high-impact operations ― requires adaptive intelligence. Monitoring sermon content, financial flows to religious institutions, the movement of people through legal and illegal channels, and the online dissemination of radical content will be essential. But such monitoring must be done within the rule of law, with oversight and clear safeguards to avoid human-rights excesses that would provide propagandistic victories to those with violent agendas.

There is also an information warfare component: extremist groups and their sympathisers will seek to amplify incidents, exaggerate state overreach, and exploit social media to sow fear; countering that requires not only debunking falsehoods but also providing constructive information that builds trust in institutions. The role of civil society ― NGOs, independent media, faith leaders, teachers, and local businesses ― cannot be overstated here: they are the first line of social immunisation against radical narratives.

Economically, long-term stabilization of border districts will hinge on connectivity and inclusion. Investing in infrastructure that links remote border towns to national markets, ensuring that border trade is formalised and beneficial to local populations, and reducing the incentives for smuggling and informal economies can undercut the patronage networks that extremist facilitators often exploit. In this respect, development is not merely about economic uplift; it is also a security investment. The most acute danger would be a mismanaged political response that either over-militarises the border at the cost of civil liberties or allows extremist networks to expand unchecked under the guise of religious activity. Both paths create catalysts for violence. A middle path ― one that combines precise intelligence action, legal accountability for incitement, diplomatic engagement with Dhaka, and robust socio-economic backstopping ― offers the best chance to neutralize the emerging threat while preserving regional stability.

Finally, strategic communication matters both internationally and domestically: New Delhi must make the case to partner capitals that Pakistan’s use of non-state proxies in Bangladesh is a destabilizing tactic with regional consequences, and it must likewise communicate clearly to its domestic constituencies the measures being taken to protect border communities without demonising entire populations. The stakes are not merely security theatre; they are about the fragile architecture of peace that binds South Asia’s plural societies.

In this light, Pakistan’s eastern strategy is both sinister and sophisticated: destabilize first through belief, infiltrate later through loyalty. An important layer in the unfolding events concerns the regional reaction, particularly from other neighboring powers observing quietly. The United States, which maintains counterterror cooperation with both India and Bangladesh, has expressed interest through embassy channels in Dhaka, while agencies in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur are monitoring Zaheer’s ties with Zakir Naik for possible violations of international financing laws. China, meanwhile, maintains studied silence, preferring to work with whichever power in Dhaka ensures stability along its Belt and Road investments.

For India’s part, the Home Ministry has escalated engagement with paramilitary forces along the Indo‑Bangla frontier, stressing cooperation with Assam Rifles and BSF intelligence detachments in Tripura and Mizoram to detect cross-border radical influx. Think tanks within New Delhi’s security establishment increasingly argue that unless Dhaka is pressured diplomatically to curb clerical militancy, the entire eastern border may transform into a zone resembling pre‑2001 western Pakistan ― a breeding ground for ideology that eventually manifests as violence. What gives Zaheer’s actions added concern is his use of historical and emotional tropes that resonate deeply with local communities.

He invokes the 1905 Partition of Bengal, portraying it as a moment of Muslim solidarity betrayed by Hindu elites; he recalls stories of Mughal Sufi saints spreading Islam across Bengal as evidence of divine mandate to resist secularism; and he repeatedly capitalizes on grievances over India’s Citizenship Amendment Act, twisting it into a rallying symbol for supposed anti‑Muslim persecution. These rhetorical tools are powerful precisely because they blur the line between nationalism and faith, producing a moral narrative that transforms political disputes into religious obligations. At the grassroots, this means mosque preachers, madrasa educators, and now even online religious influencers, repeat the framing that borders are artificial lines drawn by colonial powers and that the true unity of believers transcends these divisions. Such discourse mirrors classic LeT ideological material from the early 2000s, suggesting direct borrowing or collaboration. Beyond slogans and sermons lie material consequences.

Reports indicate increased smuggling of communication equipment through Chapainawabganj and Panchagarh routes; simultaneous, small‑scale hawala transactions recorded in Sylhet and Malda point to financial pipelines supporting clerical travel and event organization. The pattern fits the early preparatory phase of Pakistan’s proxy strategies: test ideology first, set infrastructure next.

The danger is magnified because the same corridors already serve narcotics and counterfeit networks, offering camouflage for terror‑linked logistics. Within India, sleeper cells earlier associated with Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and smaller neo‑Jamaat elements could find renewed inspiration and direction from Zaheer’s rhetoric. Security briefings within Assam and West Bengal have identified increases in radical leaflets and anonymous voice messages referencing his speeches. Thus, Hafiz Saeed’s shadow, carried eastward through Zaheer, may soon blend into a broader operational blueprint targeting India’s internal vulnerabilities. In conclusion, the Zaheer episode is not an isolated missionary expedition but the onset of a calculated ideological offensive.

It thrives on chaos within Bangladesh, leverage from Pakistan’s long‑evolved deep‑state machinery, and the negligence of international actors who underestimate soft religious radicalization. India now confronts the specter of an eastern theater of extremism fueled not by sudden invasions but by systematic narrative warfare― a slow‑burn strategy that begins with sermons and ends with militancy. Unless Dhaka recalibrates its governance to reassert control over Salafi platforms, and unless regional intelligence coordination achieves synergy, this new terror front could mature into a cross‑border crisis capable of undoing decades of counterterror effort.

The shadow stretching from Hafiz Saeed’s headquarters in Lahore now runs seamlessly through Dhaka’s mosques and madrasa networks, casting its reach across the sleepy villages that line the Indo‑Bangla fence, where every whisper, every new preacher, and every sermon might carry the faint but growing echo of a resurgent jihadist call.

If the Zaheer episode signals a broader eastern recalibration by actors aligned with Hafiz Saeed’s networks, then policymakers, religious leaders and communities across Bangladesh and India’s northeast face a closing window to act ― to cut off the oxygen of ideology and logistics that permits small provocations to metastasize into wider conflict. What is required is not paranoia but prudent, sustained action: intelligence that is surgical, diplomacy that is patient, development that is inclusive, and religious leadership that is courageous in its rejection of violence. The alternative ― a slow, combustible accumulation of grievance and radicalization along a strategically critical corridor ― would be a disaster not only for the border towns of Rajshahi or Cooch Behar but for the broader promise of peace and prosperity in a region that cannot afford another prolonged episode of cross-border strife.

हिंदी अनुवाद

कौटिल्य ने मंडल सिद्धांत दिया है, जो विभिन्न मंडलों को दर्शाने वाले संकेंद्रित वृत्त हैं। यह इस दृष्टिकोण पर आधारित है कि पड़ोसी स्वाभाविक शत्रु होते हैं। चूँकि भूमि भौतिक कल्याण का स्रोत है, इसलिए पड़ोसी भी उसी भूमि के टुकड़े को प्राप्त करना चाहते हैं... इस उद्देश्य की प्राप्ति के लिए, कौटिल्य ने षड्गुण्य सिद्धांत (छह-स्तरीय नीति) की एक रणनीति दी है, जिसका प्रयोग परिस्थिति के अनुसार किया जाना चाहिए।

दक्षिण एशिया के नक्शे पर एक छाया चुपचाप और जानबूझकर घूम रही है, जिसकी रूपरेखा एक साथ पुरानी और नई खींची गई है - पुरानी इसलिए क्योंकि यह दशकों से चले आ रहे नेटवर्क, विचारधाराओं और दुर्भावनाओं का पता लगाती है; नई इसलिए क्योंकि यह बांग्लादेश में एक उभरते हुए राजनीतिक अवसर और भारत के पूर्वी किनारे पर दबाव बिंदुओं को फिर से व्यवस्थित करने के लिए सलाफी-जिहादी अभिनेताओं के एक तेजी से बढ़ते हुए अंतर्संबंधित जाल का फायदा उठाना चाहती है। अक्टूबर 2025 के अंत में भारतीय और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय मीडिया में आई रिपोर्टों में इब्तिसाम इलाही ज़हीर की पहचान की गई थी - जो पाकिस्तान के अहल-ए-हदीस / सलाफी हलकों में एक लंबे समय से जानी-मानी हस्ती और मर्कज़ी जमीयत अहल-ए-हदीस के महासचिव हैं - जो 25 अक्टूबर को ढाका पहुंचे और फिर राजशाही, चपैनवाबगंज, रंगपुर, लालमोनिरहाट और निलफामारी सहित भारत-बांग्लादेश सीमा से सटे जिलों की एक श्रृंखला से गुजरे उन रिपोर्टों में कहा गया है कि उसकी उपस्थिति और उसके भाषणों के लहजे ने भारत के सुरक्षा विश्लेषकों को चिंतित कर दिया है, जो उनमें केवल धार्मिक प्रचार के बजाय स्पष्ट भर्ती और कट्टरपंथी इरादे देखते हैं।

ज़मीनी रिपोर्टिंग से प्राप्त ये विवरण ज़हीर को एक घुमंतू विद्वान से कहीं अधिक के रूप में चित्रित करते हैं: वे उसे हाफ़िज़ मुहम्मद सईद का एक दीर्घकालिक सहयोगी और वैचारिक और सामाजिक रूप से ऐसे नेटवर्क से जुड़ा हुआ व्यक्ति बताते हैं जिसे भारतीय राज्य लंबे समय से लश्कर-ए-तैयबा और उसके राजनीतिक-धार्मिक सहयोगियों से जोड़ता रहा है; इसका महत्व केवल संबद्धता तक ही सीमित नहीं है—यदि एक अच्छी तरह से संपर्क वाला पाकिस्तानी सलाफी व्यक्ति बांग्लादेश के सीमावर्ती ज़िलों में सार्वजनिक मंचों का उपयोग शहादत का उपदेश देने, हिंदुओं और धर्मनिरपेक्ष राजनीति को बदनाम करने, और कश्मीर जैसे विवादित क्षेत्रों में अंततः बदलाव की बधाई देने या वादा करने के लिए करता है, तो इसका प्रभाव उन समुदायों पर भी महसूस किया जाएगा जो छिद्रपूर्ण सीमाओं पर बसे हैं और उन नेटवर्कों पर भी जो विद्रोही मंसूबों या सांप्रदायिक ध्रुवीकरण को बल प्रदान करने का काम कर सकते हैं।

ज़हीर की यात्रा का घटनाक्रम दो कारणों से परेशान करने वाला है: मार्ग — सीमावर्ती ज़िलों में जानबूझकर पड़ावों का एक सिलसिला, जिनका सीमा पार तस्करी, मौसमी प्रवास और नाज़ुक क़ानून-व्यवस्था का इतिहास रहा है — और समय, जो ढाका में एक गहरे राजनीतिक झटके के बाद आया है जिसने उन लोगों के लिए एक रास्ता बनाया है जिन्हें पहले हाशिये पर धकेल दिया गया था।

कई क्षेत्रीय विश्लेषकों और स्थानीय प्रेस के अनुसार, अगस्त 2024 में, शेख हसीना के अपदस्थ होने और मुहम्मद यूनुस के नेतृत्व में एक अंतरिम शासन के आगमन ने बांग्लादेश के घरेलू राजनीतिक परिदृश्य में एक तत्काल और स्पष्ट पुनर्संतुलन पैदा किया; जो संस्थाएँ पहले चरमपंथी समूहों पर दबाव डालती थीं, उन्हें कमज़ोर कर दिया गया या उन्हें नए कार्यभार सौंप दिए गए, और राजनीतिक ध्रुवीकरण ने ऐसे क्षेत्र खोल दिए जहाँ कट्टर वैचारिक कार्यकर्ताओं को साँस लेने की जगह मिल गई। उस शांत, अधिक अराजक राजनीतिक माहौल में सीमा पार और उसके बाहर से आगंतुक आ रहे हैं—कुछ उपदेश दे रहे हैं, कुछ नेटवर्किंग कर रहे हैं—और नई दिल्ली की चिंता यह है कि पाकिस्तान की गहरी सरकार और उसके सहयोगी गैर-सरकारी प्रतिनिधि, जो ऐतिहासिक रूप से जम्मू और कश्मीर पर केंद्रित हैं, एक अलग धुरी के साथ प्रयोग कर रहे हैं: एक पूर्वी मोर्चा जिसका उद्देश्य कट्टरपंथीकरण, घुसपैठ और—यदि परिस्थितियाँ अनुमति दें—स्थानीय अशांति को भड़काना है जिसकी गूँज भारत के उत्तर-पूर्व में भी सुनाई दे सकती है।

यह काल्पनिक भूराजनीति नहीं है, बल्कि हाल की घटनाओं और ऐतिहासिक उदाहरणों में दिखाई देने वाला एक पैटर्न है: भारत में शक्ति का प्रदर्शन करने के लिए पाकिस्तान द्वारा प्रतिनिधि समूहों और धार्मिक नेटवर्क का उपयोग अच्छी तरह से प्रलेखित है; यहाँ नवीनता भौगोलिक पुनर्निर्देशन और पद्धति है। पूर्वी धुरी नियंत्रण रेखा के पार प्रत्यक्ष सशस्त्र घुसपैठ पर कम और अदला-बदली करने योग्य संसाधनों पर ज़्यादा निर्भर है—ऐसे विचारक जो स्थानीय शिकायतों को उग्रवाद में बदल सकते हैं, ऐसे छिद्रपूर्ण तस्करी मार्ग जो लोगों और सामग्रियों को चोरी-छिपे ले जा सकते हैं, और प्रवासी या भगोड़े प्रचारक जिनकी प्रतिष्ठा सीमाओं से भी तेज़ी से फैलती है। इन बदलती रणनीतियों के प्रमाण 2025 में व्यापक बंगाल क्षेत्र में गिरफ्तारियों और आतंकवाद-रोधी अभियानों के सार्वजनिक रिकॉर्ड में दिखाई देते हैं, जो सीमा पार संबंधों वाले पाकिस्तान-प्रशिक्षित गुर्गों और समूहों का खुलासा करते हैं; ऐसे मामले इस जोखिम को रेखांकित करते हैं कि वैचारिक प्रसार—उपदेश, सम्मेलन, मदरसा नेटवर्क, करिश्माई व्यक्तित्व—ज़मीनी स्तर पर संगठनात्मक भर्ती और रसद सहायता में तब्दील हो सकते हैं। ज़हीर के सार्वजनिक आह्वान - बलिदान का आह्वान, धर्मनिरपेक्ष और उदारवादी ताकतों की निंदा, कश्मीर के लिए एक कल्पित भविष्य का जश्न मनाना, और अखिल-क्षेत्रीय इस्लामी एकता की वकालत करना - एक सामाजिक पारिस्थितिकी में प्रतिध्वनित होते हैं, जहां वर्ग शिकायत, राजनीतिक असंतोष, बेरोजगारी और पहचान की चिंता उन कथाओं के लिए उपजाऊ जमीन तैयार करती है जो कथित अपमान को कार्रवाई के लिए एक धार्मिक आह्वान में बदल देती हैं।

यह बयानबाजी का लेखा-जोखा इसलिए मायने रखता है क्योंकि समकालीन जिहादी आंदोलन जितने गतिशील हैं, उतने ही मीडिया और पहचान से जुड़े प्रोजेक्ट भी हैं; जब अंतरराष्ट्रीय संबंधों वाला कोई व्यक्ति सार्वजनिक रूप से क्षेत्रीय विवादों को ब्रह्मांडीय संदर्भों में पेश करता है और अंततः राजनीतिक वास्तविकताओं को उलटने का वादा करता है, तो यह विश्वदृष्टि को कठोर बनाता है और भर्ती की सीमाओं को कम करता है। खतरे को और बढ़ाने वाला कारक सुविधा प्रदान करने का तरीका है: रिपोर्टों में कहा गया है कि ज़हीर का स्वागत अहल-ए-हदीस नेटवर्क से जुड़े स्थानीय लोगों ने किया और वह उन मौलवियों के साथ यात्रा करता था जिनका सीमावर्ती मस्जिदों और मदरसों में प्रभाव है - ऐसी संस्थाएँ, जो अतीत में धर्मार्थ और चरमपंथी दोनों गतिविधियों में संलिप्त रही हैं।

जहाँ राज्य की उपस्थिति कम है और सामुदायिक द्वारपाल मज़बूत हैं, ऐसे द्वारपाल कट्टरपंथी संदेशों और सामान्यीकरण के शांत, अधिक खतरनाक काम के लिए माध्यम बन सकते हैं: धर्मोपदेश जो धार्मिक बहस से राजनीतिक आदेशों की ओर बढ़ते हैं; धर्मार्थ नेटवर्क जो कल्याणकारी योजनाओं से कट्टरपंथी-प्रवृत्त मदरसों के संरक्षण में बदल जाते हैं; और सोशल मीडिया का विस्तार जो स्थानीय उपदेशों को वैश्विक पहुँच प्रदान करता है। चिंता का एक और कारक विभिन्न पक्षों के बीच वैचारिक श्रृंखलाओं का निर्माण है: 2024-2025 की रिपोर्टें और सोशल मीडिया दस्तावेज़ हाफ़िज़ सईद के समूह, ज़हीर के संस्थागत नेटवर्क और अन्य अंतरराष्ट्रीय प्रचारकों के बीच बातचीत का संकेत देते हैं, जिनके आख्यान सलाफ़ी व्याख्याओं और बहुलवादी समाजों के प्रति प्रतिकूल रुख़ पर केंद्रित हैं।

जब हाई-प्रोफाइल भगोड़े या निर्वासित प्रचारक - ज़ाकिर नाइक जैसे लोग, जो ध्रुवीकरण करते रहते हैं और जिनके अनुयायी बड़ी संख्या में हैं - क्षेत्रीय कट्टरपंथियों से मिलते हैं या उनके साथ बातचीत करते बताए जाते हैं, तो इससे कई नोड्स वाला एक प्रचार तंत्र तैयार होता है: प्रचार दौरे, ऑनलाइन व्याख्यान, सम्मेलन सर्किट, और धर्मोपदेशों का पाठ्य वितरण, जिन्हें भर्ती सामग्री के रूप में पुनः प्रसारित किया जा सकता है। ऐसे नेटवर्क का संरचनात्मक आकर्षण यह है कि यह विश्वसनीय खंडन की अनुमति देता है; जो कागज़ पर एक धार्मिक आदान-प्रदान जैसा दिखता है, वह व्यवहार में एक समन्वय तंत्र बन जाता है जो संवेदनशील सीमावर्ती क्षेत्रों में सक्रिय कर्ताओं को रणनीति, बातचीत के बिंदु और वैधता प्रदान करता है।

पूर्वी धुरी बनाने में पाकिस्तान का रणनीतिक तर्क निंदनीय है, लेकिन सत्ता-राजनीति के दृष्टिकोण से सुसंगत है: यदि गहन भारतीय सुरक्षा उपायों और अंतर्राष्ट्रीय जाँच के कारण पश्चिमी दबाव बिंदु (कश्मीर) को क्रियान्वित करना कठिन है, तो छिद्रपूर्ण भारत-बांग्लादेश सीमा पर अस्थिरता भड़काने से कम लागत में कई उद्देश्य प्राप्त होते हैं। यह भारत को ध्यान और संसाधनों को विभाजित करने के लिए मजबूर कर सकता है, यह सांप्रदायिक तनाव को भड़का सकता है जिससे प्राप्तकर्ता राज्यों में राजनीतिक संकट पैदा हो सकते हैं, और यह दीर्घकालिक अस्थिरता के क्षेत्र पैदा कर सकता है जो सीमावर्ती आबादी के बीच आर्थिक विकास और राज्य की वैधता को कमजोर करते हैं। समान रूप से, यह एक विरोधाभास का फायदा उठाता है: भारत के पूर्वोत्तर राज्य - असम, त्रिपुरा, पश्चिम बंगाल के उत्तरी जिले, और पश्चिम बंगाल के समुद्री और स्थलीय मार्ग - एक साथ आर्थिक रूप से बांग्लादेश से जुड़े हुए हैं और सामाजिक रूप से सीमा पार रिश्तेदारी नेटवर्क से जुड़े हुए हैं; यह संपर्क, जिसका उद्देश्य लचीलेपन और व्यापार का स्रोत होना है, दुर्भाग्य से एक कमजोरी बन सकता है यदि बाहरी कारक पहचान और शिकायत को हथियार बनाते हैं।

ऐतिहासिक समानताएं शिक्षाप्रद हैं: विद्रोही लाभ के लिए नागरिक और गैर-राज्य घेरों का उपयोग दक्षिण एशिया के अतीत में स्पष्ट था – मुजाहिदीन युग में और बाद के छद्म संघर्षों में – और नई पूर्वी पटकथा उन सबकों से उधार लेती है जबकि सोशल मीडिया की 21वीं सदी की वास्तविकता, कुछ मौसमों में मुक्त सीमा पार आंदोलन और अधिक विकेन्द्रीकृत कट्टरपंथी पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र के अनुसार तरीकों को समायोजित करती है। इसलिए बांग्लादेश की आंतरिक राजनीति और संस्थागत विकल्प यह निर्धारित करेंगे कि यह प्रकरण कैसे विकसित होता है। यदि अंतरिम सरकार मिश्रित संकेत भेजना जारी रखती है – कुछ मामलों में अभियोजन पक्ष, अन्य में अनुज्ञेय, और भड़काऊ संदेश देने वाले हाई-प्रोफाइल आगंतुकों के बारे में काफी हद तक चुप – यह एक ग्रे ज़ोन बनाता है जहां चरमपंथी दंड से मुक्ति के साथ या इससे भी बदतर, अप्रत्यक्ष संरक्षण के साथ काम कर सकते हैं। फिर भी राजनीतिक लागतें—रूढ़िवादी मतदाताओं से घरेलू प्रतिक्रिया, अंतर्राष्ट्रीय कूटनीतिक संतुलन और संक्रमणकालीन शासन की उथल-पुथल—सीधे नीतिगत विकल्पों को जटिल बना देती हैं। नई दिल्ली के दृष्टिकोण से, तात्कालिक नीतिगत अनिवार्यता निवारण और कूटनीति को संतुलित करना है: ढाका के साथ सहयोगात्मक खुफिया जानकारी साझा करने पर ज़ोर देना, उन समुदायों में सीमा प्रबंधन को मज़बूत करना जहाँ कट्टरपंथी संदेशों ने पैर जमा लिए हैं, और सूक्ष्म लेकिन निरंतर प्रति-कथात्मक अभियान चलाना जो आस्था की हिंसक व्याख्याओं को अमान्य ठहराते हैं और साथ ही युवाओं के लिए वैकल्पिक रास्ते भी प्रस्तुत करते हैं।

भारत की सुरक्षा एजेंसियों ने कथित तौर पर सीमावर्ती ज़िलों में सतर्कता बढ़ा दी है और यात्रा कार्यक्रमों और धर्मोपदेशों पर नज़र रख रही हैं; 2025 में बंगाल में गिरफ़्तारियाँ और आतंकवाद-रोधी अभियान एक सक्रिय रुख़ को दर्शाते हैं जो हमलों का समन्वय करने से पहले ही गुटों को रोकने का प्रयास करता है। लेकिन सिर्फ़ पुलिसिंग से दिल और दिमाग़ नहीं जीता जा सकता, और जातीय रूप से मिश्रित या आर्थिक रूप से कमज़ोर ज़िलों में कठोर सुरक्षा प्रतिक्रियाएँ स्थानीय आबादी को अलग-थलग करने और अनजाने में भर्ती करने वालों के ऐसे आख्यानों को बढ़ावा देने का जोखिम उठाती हैं जो राज्य की कार्रवाई को उत्पीड़न के रूप में चित्रित करते हैं।

इसलिए मानवीय और सामाजिक-आर्थिक आयाम केंद्रीय हैं: कट्टरपंथ के विरुद्ध दीर्घकालिक लचीलेपन के लिए शिक्षा, विश्वसनीय स्थानीय शासन, रोज़गार सृजन और सामुदायिक संस्थाओं को मज़बूत बनाने में निवेश की आवश्यकता है जो युवाओं को सर्वनाशकारी आख्यानों से सुरक्षित कर सकें। इस अर्थ में, एक व्यापक दृष्टिकोण में गतिज सुरक्षा उपायों को सॉफ्ट-पावर हस्तक्षेपों के साथ जोड़ा जाना चाहिए - छात्रवृत्तियाँ, स्थानीय धार्मिक नेतृत्व की सहभागिता, सीमावर्ती ज़िलों को लक्षित आर्थिक विकास कार्यक्रम, और सार्वजनिक कूटनीति ताकि यह दिखाया जा सके कि बहुलवाद, गौरव और शहादत के कट्टरपंथी वादों की तुलना में बेहतर भौतिक परिणाम देता है। भू-राजनीतिक रूप से, ज़हीर प्रकरण इस बात को रेखांकित करता है कि कैसे गैर-राज्य और अर्ध-राज्यीय तत्व अब भारत और पाकिस्तान के बीच व्यापक रणनीतिक प्रतिस्पर्धा में प्रमुख साधन हैं; उनके संचालन मानक अंतरराज्यीय कूटनीति को जटिल बनाते हैं क्योंकि वे मूल राज्यों के लिए प्रशंसनीय खंडन प्रदान करते हैं और क्योंकि वे घरेलू कानून, सीमा पार समुदायों और अंतरराष्ट्रीय विचारधाराओं के बीच विरल स्थानों में काम करते हैं।

तनाव बढ़ने का जोखिम वास्तविक है: यदि कोई सीमा पार का तत्व सफलतापूर्वक सैन्य संबंधों को पुनर्गठित करता है और यदि कोई उत्तेजित स्थानीय समूह भारतीय धरती पर हिंसा करता है, तो नई दिल्ली पर बलपूर्वक प्रतिक्रिया देने का राजनीतिक दबाव बहुत अधिक हो सकता है, और ऐसी प्रतिक्रिया बदले में सीमा पार जवाबी कार्रवाई में बदल सकती है।

यह खतरनाक चक्रव्यूह ही है जो रोकथाम को - खुफिया जानकारी, कूटनीति और स्थानीय लचीलापन निर्माण के माध्यम से - एकमात्र प्राथमिकता बनाता है। छेड़े जा रहे आख्यानों के संघर्ष को पहचानना भी महत्वपूर्ण है: कट्टरपंथी तत्व एक राजनीतिक विवाद को एक आध्यात्मिक युद्ध में बदलने की कोशिश करते हैं, नैतिक निरंकुशता को आमंत्रित करते हैं और राजनीति द्वारा अपेक्षित अव्यवस्थित समझौतों को अस्वीकार करते हैं। इसका मुकाबला करने के लिए एक अलग बयानबाजी की रणनीति की आवश्यकता है: एक ऐसी रणनीति जो हाशिए पर पड़े समुदायों की वास्तविक शिकायतों को स्वीकार करे, अभिव्यक्ति और निवारण के लिए व्यवहार्य रास्ते प्रदान करे, और उन धार्मिक और नैतिक दावों को ध्वस्त करे जिनका उपयोग आतंकवादी हिंसा को सही ठहराने के लिए करते हैं। कट्टरपंथ पर विद्वतापूर्ण कार्य पहचान, कथित अन्याय, समूह गतिशीलता और धार्मिक अधिकार की भूमिका पर जोर देता है; इसलिए टीकाकरण में बहुलवादी धार्मिक विमर्श को मज़बूत करना और हिंसा को अस्वीकार करने वाले उदारवादी पादरियों को सशक्त बनाना शामिल है—यह एक लंबा और श्रमसाध्य कार्य है, लेकिन ज़रूरी भी है।

क्षेत्रीय साझेदारों और बहुपक्षीय संस्थाओं की भूमिका भी महत्वपूर्ण है। बांग्लादेश सिर्फ़ एक बफर स्टेट नहीं है; यह एक संप्रभु कर्ता है जिसकी अपनी राजनीतिक दिशा है। क्षेत्रीय स्थिरता के लिए चिंतित अंतर्राष्ट्रीय साझेदार, जिनमें संयुक्त राष्ट्र और आसियान पर्यवेक्षक शामिल हैं, हिंसक उग्रवाद का मुकाबला करने में तकनीकी सहायता के लिए मंच प्रदान कर सकते हैं: मदरसा नियमन से जुड़ी सर्वोत्तम प्रथाओं को साझा करना जो धार्मिक स्वतंत्रता का सम्मान करते हुए नफ़रत फैलाने वाली बातों पर नकेल कसें; समुदाय-केंद्रित हस्तक्षेप कार्यक्रमों को डिज़ाइन करने में मदद करना; और स्वतंत्र मीडिया को संतुलित रिपोर्टिंग सुनिश्चित करने में सहायता करना जो उग्रवादी बयानबाज़ी को बढ़ावा न दे।

कानूनी दृष्टिकोण से, अंतर्राष्ट्रीय आतंकवाद-रोधी ढाँचों के तहत ढाका के दायित्वों के अनुसार, उसे हिंसा भड़काने वाली या आतंकवाद को भौतिक रूप से समर्थन देने वाली गतिविधियों की जाँच और उन पर अंकुश लगाना आवश्यक है; ज़हीर जैसे दौरों को लेकर अस्पष्टता विश्वसनीयता का अभाव पैदा करती है जिसका फायदा दुर्भावनापूर्ण तत्व उठा सकते हैं और जो क्षेत्रीय सहयोग को कमज़ोर करता है। साथ ही, व्यापक या सांप्रदायिक नीतियों के ख़तरों को रेखांकित करना भी ज़रूरी है: ऐसे उपाय जो पूरे समुदायों को कलंकित करते हैं या जो वैध धार्मिक अभिव्यक्ति को हिंसक उग्रवाद के साथ मिला देते हैं, उन दरारों को और गहरा करने का जोखिम उठाते हैं जिनका चरमपंथी फायदा उठाते हैं, और इसलिए इनसे बचना चाहिए।

एक गंभीर ऐतिहासिक सबक यह है कि जिहादी नेटवर्क अक्सर भर्ती के लिए स्थानीय शिकायतों पर निर्भर रहे हैं, और बाद में एक बाहरी संगठनात्मक तर्क थोपते हैं जो समुदायों के भीतर असहमति को कम सहनशील होता है। इसे समझते हुए, नीतिगत प्रतिक्रियाओं को सामुदायिक एजेंसी को बढ़ावा देना चाहिए और समस्या को केवल सीमा पार "सुरक्षा" के मुद्दे के रूप में बाहरी रूप से देखने से बचना चाहिए; इसके बजाय, इसे एक बहुआयामी सामाजिक और राजनीतिक चुनौती के रूप में देखना चाहिए। विश्लेषकों को इन नेटवर्कों के सामरिक विकास पर भी नज़र रखनी चाहिए। प्रत्यक्ष सैन्य आक्रमणों से मिश्रित रणनीतियों की ओर बदलाव - आध्यात्मिक नेता जो वैचारिक सुरक्षा प्रदान करते हैं, प्रवासी प्रचारक जो करिश्माई वैधता प्रदान करते हैं, और स्थानीय ज़मीनी स्तर के संगठन जो कम लागत वाले, उच्च प्रभाव वाले अभियानों को अंजाम देते हैं - के लिए अनुकूली बुद्धिमत्ता की आवश्यकता होती है। धर्मोपदेश की सामग्री, धार्मिक संस्थाओं को मिलने वाले वित्तीय प्रवाह, वैध और अवैध माध्यमों से लोगों की आवाजाही और कट्टरपंथी सामग्री के ऑनलाइन प्रसार पर निगरानी ज़रूरी होगी। लेकिन यह निगरानी क़ानून के दायरे में, मानवाधिकारों के उल्लंघन से बचने के लिए, निगरानी और स्पष्ट सुरक्षा उपायों के साथ की जानी चाहिए, जिससे हिंसक एजेंडे रखने वालों को दुष्प्रचार में फ़ायदा हो।

इसमें सूचना युद्ध का एक पहलू भी है: चरमपंथी समूह और उनके समर्थक घटनाओं को बढ़ा-चढ़ाकर पेश करने, राज्य के अतिक्रमण को बढ़ा-चढ़ाकर पेश करने और भय फैलाने के लिए सोशल मीडिया का दुरुपयोग करने की कोशिश करेंगे; इसका मुकाबला करने के लिए न केवल झूठ का पर्दाफाश करना होगा, बल्कि संस्थाओं में विश्वास पैदा करने वाली रचनात्मक जानकारी भी प्रदान करनी होगी। नागरिक समाज - गैर सरकारी संगठन, स्वतंत्र मीडिया, धर्मगुरु, शिक्षक और स्थानीय व्यवसाय - की भूमिका को यहाँ कम करके नहीं आंका जा सकता: वे कट्टरपंथी आख्यानों के विरुद्ध सामाजिक प्रतिरक्षण की पहली पंक्ति हैं।

आर्थिक रूप से, सीमावर्ती ज़िलों का दीर्घकालिक स्थिरीकरण कनेक्टिविटी और समावेशन पर निर्भर करेगा। दूरस्थ सीमावर्ती कस्बों को राष्ट्रीय बाज़ारों से जोड़ने वाले बुनियादी ढाँचे में निवेश, यह सुनिश्चित करना कि सीमा व्यापार औपचारिक और स्थानीय आबादी के लिए लाभदायक हो, और तस्करी और अनौपचारिक अर्थव्यवस्थाओं के लिए प्रोत्साहन को कम करना, उन संरक्षण नेटवर्क को कमज़ोर कर सकता है जिनका चरमपंथी सूत्रधार अक्सर शोषण करते हैं। इस संबंध में, विकास केवल आर्थिक उत्थान के बारे में नहीं है; यह एक सुरक्षा निवेश भी है। सबसे गंभीर ख़तरा एक कुप्रबंधित राजनीतिक प्रतिक्रिया होगी जो या तो नागरिक स्वतंत्रता की क़ीमत पर सीमा का अति-सैन्यीकरण करेगी या धार्मिक गतिविधि की आड़ में चरमपंथी नेटवर्क को बेरोकटोक विस्तार करने देगी। दोनों ही रास्ते हिंसा के उत्प्रेरक पैदा करते हैं। एक मध्यम मार्ग—जिसमें सटीक ख़ुफ़िया कार्रवाई, उकसावे के लिए क़ानूनी जवाबदेही, ढाका के साथ कूटनीतिक जुड़ाव और मज़बूत सामाजिक-आर्थिक समर्थन शामिल हो—क्षेत्रीय स्थिरता को बनाए रखते हुए उभरते ख़तरे को बेअसर करने का सबसे अच्छा मौक़ा प्रदान करता है।

अंततः, रणनीतिक संचार अंतरराष्ट्रीय और घरेलू, दोनों स्तरों पर महत्वपूर्ण है: नई दिल्ली को साझेदार देशों के सामने यह तर्क रखना चाहिए कि बांग्लादेश में पाकिस्तान द्वारा गैर-सरकारी प्रॉक्सी का इस्तेमाल एक अस्थिरता पैदा करने वाली रणनीति है जिसके क्षेत्रीय परिणाम होंगे, और इसी तरह उसे अपने घरेलू मतदाताओं को भी स्पष्ट रूप से यह बताना होगा कि सीमावर्ती समुदायों की सुरक्षा के लिए उठाए जा रहे क़दम पूरी आबादी को बदनाम किए बिना उठाए जा रहे हैं। दांव सिर्फ़ सुरक्षा का नाटक नहीं है; बल्कि दक्षिण एशिया के बहुलवादी समाजों को जोड़ने वाली शांति की नाज़ुक संरचना है।

इस प्रकाश में, पाकिस्तान की पूर्वी रणनीति भयावह और परिष्कृत दोनों है: पहले विश्वास के माध्यम से अस्थिर करें, बाद में वफादारी के माध्यम से घुसपैठ करें। सामने आ रही घटनाओं में एक महत्वपूर्ण परत क्षेत्रीय प्रतिक्रिया से संबंधित है, विशेष रूप से अन्य पड़ोसी शक्तियों से जो चुपचाप देख रहे हैं। संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका, जो भारत और बांग्लादेश दोनों के साथ आतंकवाद विरोधी सहयोग बनाए रखता है, ने ढाका में दूतावास के माध्यम से रुचि व्यक्त की है, जबकि सिंगापुर और कुआलालंपुर की एजेंसियां ​​​​अंतर्राष्ट्रीय वित्तपोषण कानूनों के संभावित उल्लंघन के लिए ज़हीर के ज़ाकिर नाइक के साथ संबंधों की निगरानी कर रही हैं।

इस बीच, चीन ने जानबूझकर चुप्पी साध रखी है, और ढाका में उस शक्ति के साथ काम करना पसंद करता है जो उसके बेल्ट एंड रोड निवेशों में स्थिरता सुनिश्चित करती है। भारत की ओर से, गृह मंत्रालय ने भारत-बांग्लादेश सीमा पर अर्धसैनिक बलों के साथ जुड़ाव बढ़ाया है नई दिल्ली के सुरक्षा प्रतिष्ठान के थिंक टैंक लगातार यह तर्क दे रहे हैं कि जब तक ढाका पर मौलवी उग्रवाद पर लगाम लगाने के लिए कूटनीतिक दबाव नहीं डाला जाता, पूरी पूर्वी सीमा 2001 से पहले के पश्चिमी पाकिस्तान जैसे क्षेत्र में तब्दील हो सकती है—ऐसी विचारधारा का प्रजनन स्थल जो अंततः हिंसा के रूप में सामने आती है। ज़हीर के कार्यों को और भी चिंताजनक बनाने वाला उनका ऐतिहासिक और भावनात्मक रूपक प्रयोग है जो स्थानीय समुदायों के साथ गहराई से जुड़ता है।

वे 1905 के बंगाल विभाजन का हवाला देते हैं और इसे हिंदू अभिजात वर्ग द्वारा धोखा दिए गए मुस्लिम एकजुटता के क्षण के रूप में चित्रित करते हैं; वे धर्मनिरपेक्षता का विरोध करने के दैवीय आदेश के प्रमाण के रूप में बंगाल में इस्लाम फैलाने वाले मुगल सूफी संतों की कहानियों को याद करते हैं; और वे बार-बार भारत के नागरिकता संशोधन अधिनियम पर शिकायतों का फायदा उठाते हैं, इसे कथित मुस्लिम विरोधी उत्पीड़न के एक रैली के प्रतीक में बदल देते हैं। ये बयानबाजी के उपकरण इसलिए शक्तिशाली हैं क्योंकि ये राष्ट्रवाद और आस्था के बीच की रेखा को धुंधला कर देते हैं, एक नैतिक आख्यान का निर्माण करते हैं जो राजनीतिक विवादों को धार्मिक दायित्वों में बदल देता है। जमीनी स्तर पर, इसका मतलब है कि मस्जिद के उपदेशक, मदरसा शिक्षक और अब ऑनलाइन धार्मिक प्रभावक भी इस धारणा को दोहराते हैं कि सीमाएं औपनिवेशिक शक्तियों द्वारा खींची गई कृत्रिम रेखाएं हैं और विश्वासियों की सच्ची एकता इन विभाजनों से परे है। इस तरह की बातचीत 2000 के दशक की शुरुआत से लश्कर की वैचारिक सामग्री को प्रतिबिंबित करती है, जो प्रत्यक्ष उधार या सहयोग का सुझाव देती है। नारों और उपदेशों से परे भौतिक परिणाम छिपे हैं।

रिपोर्ट चपैनवाबगंज और पंचगढ़ मार्गों के माध्यम से संचार उपकरणों की तस्करी में वृद्धि का संकेत देती हैं; सिलहट और मालदा में एक साथ दर्ज किए गए छोटे पैमाने के हवाला लेनदेन मौलवियों की यात्रा और कार्यक्रम आयोजन का समर्थन करने वाली वित्तीय पाइपलाइनों की ओर इशारा करते हैं। यह पैटर्न पाकिस्तान की छद्म रणनीतियों के शुरुआती तैयारी चरण से मेल खाता है: पहले विचारधारा का परीक्षण करें, फिर बुनियादी ढांचा तैयार करें। भारत के भीतर, स्टूडेंट्स इस्लामिक मूवमेंट ऑफ़ इंडिया (सिमी) और छोटे नव-जमात तत्वों से जुड़े स्लीपर सेल, ज़हीर की बयानबाज़ी से नई प्रेरणा और दिशा पा सकते हैं। असम और पश्चिम बंगाल में सुरक्षा ब्रीफिंग में उसके भाषणों का हवाला देते हुए कट्टरपंथी पर्चों और गुमनाम वॉयस मैसेजों में बढ़ोतरी देखी गई है। इस प्रकार, ज़हीर के ज़रिए पूर्व की ओर फैली हाफ़िज़ सईद की छाया जल्द ही भारत की आंतरिक कमज़ोरियों को निशाना बनाने वाले एक व्यापक ऑपरेशनल ब्लूप्रिंट में शामिल हो सकती है।

निष्कर्षतः, ज़हीर प्रकरण कोई अलग-थलग मिशनरी अभियान नहीं, बल्कि एक सुनियोजित वैचारिक आक्रमण की शुरुआत है। यह बांग्लादेश के भीतर अराजकता, पाकिस्तान की लंबे समय से विकसित डीप-स्टेट मशीनरी के लाभ और उन अंतरराष्ट्रीय कर्ताओं की लापरवाही पर पनपता है जो नरम धार्मिक कट्टरपंथ को कम आंकते हैं। भारत अब उग्रवाद के एक पूर्वी क्षेत्र के साये का सामना कर रहा है, जो अचानक आक्रमणों से नहीं, बल्कि व्यवस्थित आख्यानात्मक युद्ध से प्रेरित है—एक धीमी गति से चलने वाली रणनीति जो उपदेशों से शुरू होती है और उग्रवाद पर खत्म होती है। जब तक ढाका सलाफी मंचों पर नियंत्रण स्थापित करने के लिए अपनी शासन व्यवस्था में बदलाव नहीं करता और क्षेत्रीय खुफिया समन्वय में तालमेल नहीं बनता, तब तक यह नया आतंकी मोर्चा एक सीमापार संकट में तब्दील हो सकता है जो दशकों से चल रहे आतंकवाद-रोधी प्रयासों पर पानी फेर सकता है।

लाहौर स्थित हाफिज सईद के मुख्यालय से फैली छाया अब ढाका की मस्जिदों और मदरसा नेटवर्कों में निर्बाध रूप से फैल रही है और भारत-बांग्लादेश सीमा पर स्थित उनींदे गाँवों तक पहुँच रही है, जहाँ हर फुसफुसाहट, हर नया उपदेशक और हर धर्मोपदेश एक उभरते जिहादी आह्वान की धीमी लेकिन बढ़ती हुई प्रतिध्वनि लिए हुए हो सकता है।

अगर ज़हीर प्रकरण हाफ़िज़ सईद के नेटवर्क से जुड़े लोगों द्वारा पूर्वी क्षेत्र में व्यापक बदलाव का संकेत देता है, तो नीति-निर्माताओं, धार्मिक नेताओं और बांग्लादेश तथा भारत के पूर्वोत्तर के समुदायों के सामने कार्रवाई करने का एक सुनहरा मौका है— विचारधारा और रसद की उस ऑक्सीजन को खत्म करना जो छोटी-छोटी उकसावेबाजी को व्यापक संघर्ष में बदलने का मौका देती है। ज़रूरत है तो व्यामोह की नहीं, बल्कि विवेकपूर्ण और निरंतर कार्रवाई की: सर्जिकल इंटेलिजेंस, धैर्यपूर्ण कूटनीति, समावेशी विकास और हिंसा को नकारने का साहस रखने वाले धार्मिक नेतृत्व की। विकल्प—रणनीतिक रूप से महत्वपूर्ण गलियारे में शिकायतों और कट्टरपंथ का धीमा और ज्वलनशील संचय—न केवल राजशाही या कूचबिहार के सीमावर्ती शहरों के लिए, बल्कि उस क्षेत्र में शांति और समृद्धि के व्यापक वादे के लिए भी विनाशकारी होगा, जो सीमा पार संघर्ष की एक और लंबी घटना को बर्दाश्त नहीं कर सकता।

Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (MJAH) is an Islamic organization associated with the Ahl-e-Hadith movement, a Salafi reform movement founded in the Indian subcontinent. It has branches in several countries, including Pakistan and India, and functions as both a religious and political party in some regions. MJAH's activities include running religious schools, providing community services like funerals and education, and engaging in social and political advocacy. 

Ibtisam Ilahi Zahir (born 12 January 1972) is a Pakistani Islamic scholar. A member of the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith and is known for his inter-Islamic activities, promoting unity between the Madhhabs within Islam. He is the eldest son of Ehsan Elahi Zaheer

Abdul Rehman Makki, alongside Hafiz Saeed, was working for Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Pakistan Defence Council) which was established to defend the interests of Pakistan and to agitate against the drone attacks in Waziristan, Pakistan. DPC, in its own words, is against the war in Afghanistan.Hafiz Abdul Rahman Makki, the brother-in-law of Mumbai attacks mastermind Hafiz Saeed and deputy chief of the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

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• August 2024

Sheikh Hasina resigns / ousted amid political turmoil and protests. Muhammad Yunus forms interim government in Bangladesh.

Creates a political vacuum; weakens security oversight and anti-extremism mechanisms.

• September 2024

Early reports of Salafi preachers gaining visibility in Dhaka and Rajshahi. Some linked to Ahl-e-Hadith movements.

Signals ideological resurgence after years of suppression.

• October 10–12, 2024

Zakir Naik visits Pakistan, meets with Ibtisam Elahi Zaheer and members of Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith.

Establishes cross-border ideological alignment; begins coordination for South Asian Salafi revival.

• October 25, 2024

Zaheer’s first visit to Bangladesh (undisclosed itinerary). Private meetings with clerics in Dhaka and Rajshahi.

A trial run; gauges environment and response of Bangladeshi authorities.

• January 2025

Internal intelligence alerts from India’s agencies flag renewed activity of LeT-linked individuals in Bangladesh border regions.

Early warning to BSF, RAW, and NIA.

• March 2025

Reports of funding inflow from Pakistani charities to certain Bangladeshi religious schools in Rangpur and Nilphamari.

Financial logistics being laid for longer-term recruitment.

• May 2025

Pakistani NGO Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FIF) shows unexplained transactions into South Bengal microfinance accounts.

Suspected indirect funding channel for ideological outreach.

• August 2025

Local intelligence in Chapainawabganj and Joypurhat report arrival of new clerics preaching anti-India rhetoric.

Ground preparation for Zaheer’s high-profile tour.

• October 25, 2025

Zaheer arrives in Dhaka for his second visit (public and open). Welcomed by Abdur Rahim bin Abdur Razzaq of Al Jamia As-Salifa.

Open legitimization of Pakistani Salafi presence.

• Oct 27–31, 2025

Zaheer tours Rajshahi, Chapainawabganj, Rangpur, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari. Delivers speeches calling for sacrifice and jihad against Hindus.

Direct ideological provocation; close to Indian border.

• Oct 1–2, 2025

Visits Joypurhat and Nagaon, meets Sheikh Abdul Razzaq bin Yusuf. Video clips emerge on social media.

Radical sermons gain online traction; mass reach beyond mosques.

• Oct Nov 6–7, 2025

Addresses Salafi Conference at Dangipara, Rajshahi ― ~10,000 attendees, including clerics from India and Nepal.

Demonstrates transnational Salafi coordination; Indian agencies alarmed.

• Oct Nov 8, 2025

Scheduled return to Pakistan via Dhaka. Local media silent; interim government issues no statement.

Suggests tacit approval or unwillingness to confront radicalization.

• Nov–Dec 2025 (Projected)

Anticipated Zakir Naik visit to Bangladesh, coordinated through same Ahl-e-Hadith channels.

Consolidation of a “Salafi Axis” ― Pakistan–Malaysia–Bangladesh triangle with Indian northeast as target.