THE TURKISH SHADOW OVER DELHI: HOW A RED FORT BLAST LED TO ANKARA.

“The Red Fort blast did not just expose a terror plot―it exposed a foreign ideology breathing down India’s neck.”

In the immediate aftermath of the Red Fort blast, public suspicion instinctively drifted towards Pakistan, the habitual architect of cross-border terrorism against India, yet digital forensics and communication intercepts led investigators somewhere far more unexpected: Ankara. For the first time, a major terror-linked trail from Indian soil connected directly to Turkey’s capital, revealing a handler, operating under the alias “Ukasa,” who guided the two accused―Dr. Umar Mohammed and Dr. Muzammil―through a session-based encrypted app designed to evade both metadata mapping and server-level tracebacks. This connection was not merely a footnote in a wider terror narrative; it pierced open a long-simmering strategic concern, exposing Turkey’s entry into South Asia’s radicalisation ecosystem. Under President Erdoğan,

“Ankara’s influence no longer travels through diplomats; it travels through scholarships, encrypted chats, and radicalised youth networks.”

Turkey’s slow but deliberate ideological pivot―once subtle, now unmistakable―has evolved into a parallel channel of influence running alongside Pakistan’s long-standing proxy networks and Bangladesh’s subterranean Islamist organisations. Unlike a one-off terror conspiracy, the Red Fort case revealed an entire cross-border ideological ecosystem built patiently over two decades, weaving together Turkish soft-power institutions, Pakistani intelligence assets, and Bangladesh-based radical networks, all converging upon India’s youth spaces, university campuses, religious seminaries, and digital communities. The discovery shocked many Indians, but for security agencies who quietly tracked Turkey’s ideological overreach, it only confirmed a growing fear: Ankara was no longer an observer in South Asia―it was becoming an actor.

This shift cannot be understood without examining Turkey’s transformation under Erdoğan. Once hailed as a model secular democracy for the Muslim world, Turkey underwent an ideological revolution that turned it into a global centre of political Islam, drawing inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood and positioning itself as the protector of Muslim causes worldwide. Over the past ten years, this ideological nationalism has been coupled with strategic opportunism―supporting Pakistan’s narratives on Kashmir, spearheading anti-India rhetoric in international forums, blocking India’s diplomatic initiatives, and aggressively nurturing cultural, educational, and religious influence in South Asia.

“When ideology becomes a foreign policy tool, universities become battlefields.”

After the abrogation of Article 370, Erdoğan repeatedly echoed Pakistan’s stance at the UNGA, criticising India almost verbatim from Islamabad’s script. This alignment deepened through military cooperation: Turkey modernised Pakistan’s warships, sold advanced drones, trained Pakistani officers, and even assisted Islamabad’s lobbying operations across Western diplomatic circles. Pakistan, in turn, amplified Turkey’s cultural and ideological influence; Turkish dramas, clerical networks, and digital campaigns found eager promoters in Pakistani media channels. Bangladesh added its own complexity: although publicly neutral, Islamist groups emboldened under the Yunus regime maintained longstanding ties with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami and were increasingly plugged into Turkey’s expanding religious and development networks. These Indo-Pak-Bangla linkages―historically ideological, now institutional―created a fertile environment for Turkey’s outreach to penetrate Indian society.

The bridge into India, however, did not begin with terror operatives but with scholarships, cultural exchanges, youth organisations, and religious foundations that presented themselves as benign international engagement. Turkey’s flagship scholarship scheme, Turkiye Burslari, quietly became one of the largest foreign-funded academic channels attracting Indian Muslim students, particularly from urban academic hubs and campuses where organised student bodies such as the Fraternity Movement, SIO-linked groups, and independent Muslim collectives flourished. Unlike Western scholarships focused on academic output, Turkish scholarships emphasised ideological immersion―intensive Turkish-language training, long cultural modules, Brotherhood-inspired political lectures, and constant interaction with Pakistani and Bangladeshi students who carried their own radicalised narratives. Many Indian students returned with a distinctly political conception of identity: Turkey as spiritual homeland, Erdoğan as a symbolic leader, and India as an oppressive “majoritarian” state―a narrative framework mirroring Turkish political Islam and Pakistani propaganda. Parallel to Burslari, the Turkish Diyanet Foundation (TDV) sponsored religious education for South Asian youth, training imams and religious scholars in Ankara and Konya. These programs fused theology with political messaging, grooming graduates who later returned to India as preachers, community organisers, and social media influencers shaping local Muslim discourse. Over time, this produced a quiet cadre of ideologically aligned individuals deeply influenced by Ankara’s worldview.

“Turkey has mastered what Pakistan failed to do for decades: convert emotional loyalty into political influence.”

Beyond scholarships, Turkey’s youth organisations played a much more active role. TUGVA, run by Erdoğan’s inner circle and flagged in multiple European intelligence reports for extremist indoctrination, invited South Asian students to leadership camps designed around “Muslim unity,” “resistance,” and “identity mobilisation.” Participants met activists from Pakistan’s Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba and Bangladesh’s Islami Chhatra Shibir―groups with documented histories of political violence. The Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), controversially associated with armed networks in Syria, served as another gateway for outreach, working with South Asian groups including India’s PFI, as reported by Nordic Monitor. TIKA, Turkey’s development agency, also attempted quiet entry into India’s NGO sector, mirroring its influence operations in Africa and Central Asia where developmental projects doubled as ideological leverage. Maarif Foundation schools, already influential in Pakistan and Afghanistan, eyed expansion into India before quietly stepping back due to scrutiny. Yet the most discreet and influential institution connecting South Asia to Turkey was IIFSO―the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations―a transnational consortium that brought together Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Malaysian, and Turkish student bodies under one Ankara-based umbrella. Through conferences, leadership workshops, and digital networking, IIFSO created transnational ideological bridges that allowed students from India’s campuses to mingle with activists from radicalised organisations of South Asia, often normalising the language of Islamist political identity and grievance.

“Ideologies don’t need passports. They only need young minds searching for identity.”

This ideological ecosystem posed a new type of challenge for Indian security agencies. Unlike SIMI or PFI, which openly confronted the state and displayed visible extremist tendencies, these new student networks appeared legal, academic, articulate, and digitally sophisticated. They operated within constitutional spaces and used democratic tools―campus politics, social media activism, academic seminars―to shape public discourse. Their proximity to Turkey’s ideological platforms gave them access to international conferences, global Muslim youth forums, and Turkish cultural institutions, enabling them to produce coherent, polished narratives that often mirrored Ankara’s political messaging: India as a majoritarian state, Turkey as the world’s defender of Muslims, Kashmir as an international conflict, Hindutva as a global threat, and Muslim solidarity as a global duty. These narratives surfaced prominently during the anti-CAA protests, the NRC agitation, the Hijab controversy, and numerous campus-led movements―sometimes subtly, sometimes openly.

Bangladesh acted as the third pillar holding up this network. Organisations like Islami Chhatra Shibir maintained covert ties with Pakistan’s Jamaat networks and operational links with JMB, which historically carried out attacks inside India, particularly in Assam, West Bengal, and Bihar. When ICS leaders travelled to Turkey for IIFSO events, they met Indian student activists, creating ideological crosscurrents between Dhaka, Karachi, and Delhi. Although Bangladesh’s government publicly cracked down on JMB and Jamaat networks, their student organisations remained deeply embedded in campus politics and continued to serve as ideological nodes for transnational outreach. For Turkey, these networks offered a ready-made entry point into India’s neighbourhood.

“This is a new kind of encirclement―not territorial, but psychological.”

The result was an ecosystem too complex to counter with conventional counterterrorism tools. Radicalisation no longer depended solely on clandestine operatives or madrasa-based indoctrination; it spread through academic exchanges, global identity narratives, digital propaganda, and scholarship programs wrapped in the language of human rights and global solidarity. By the time India uncovered Turkey’s link in the Red Fort blast, the ideological groundwork enabling such influence had already been quietly laid for years. India thus faces a three-directional threat: Turkey’s ideological expansion, Pakistan’s intelligence operations, and Bangladesh’s radical networks―aligned not necessarily through formal agreements but through shared worldviews, overlapping platforms, and ideological synchronisation. The battleground has shifted from borders to campuses, from safe houses to WhatsApp groups, from radical preachers to scholarship brochures. If India wishes to counter this emerging ecosystem, it must build counter-narratives, scrutinise foreign-funded educational channels, strengthen youth engagement, and reform campus outreach strategies without compromising constitutional freedoms. The threat is ideological, decentralised, and generational―one that demands intellectual vigilance as much as security intervention. Ignoring it today means confronting a far deeper crisis tomorrow, not driven by bombs or bullets alone but by minds shaped elsewhere, loyal to narratives built in Ankara, and aligned with geopolitical agendas far beyond India’s shores.

India asked Turkey for better bilateral relations; Turkey responded by sending encrypted messages. Truly heartwarming.!!!

हिंदी अनुवाद

"लाल किला विस्फोट ने न केवल एक आतंकी साजिश का पर्दाफाश किया, बल्कि इसने भारत की गर्दन पर मंडरा रही एक विदेशी विचारधारा को भी उजागर कर दिया।"

लाल किला विस्फोट के तुरंत बाद, जनता का संदेह सहज रूप से पाकिस्तान की ओर बढ़ गया, जो भारत के खिलाफ सीमा पार आतंकवाद का अभ्यस्त सूत्रधार है, फिर भी डिजिटल फोरेंसिक और संचार अवरोधों ने जाँचकर्ताओं को कहीं अधिक अप्रत्याशित दिशा में पहुँचाया: अंकारा। पहली बार, भारतीय धरती से आतंकवाद से जुड़ा एक बड़ा सुराग सीधे तुर्की की राजधानी अंकारा से जुड़ा, जिससे एक हैंडलर का पता चला, जो "उकासा" उपनाम से काम कर रहा था, जिसने दो आरोपियों - डॉ. उमर मोहम्मद और डॉ. मुज़म्मिल - को एक सत्र-आधारित एन्क्रिप्टेड ऐप के माध्यम से निर्देशित किया, जिसे मेटाडेटा मैपिंग और सर्वर-स्तरीय ट्रेसबैक, दोनों से बचने के लिए डिज़ाइन किया गया था। यह संबंध व्यापक आतंकी आख्यान में केवल एक फुटनोट नहीं था; इसने एक लंबे समय से सुलग रही रणनीतिक चिंता को उजागर किया, जिसने दक्षिण एशिया के कट्टरपंथीकरण पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र में तुर्की के प्रवेश को उजागर किया। राष्ट्रपति एर्दोआन के अधीन,

“अंकारा का प्रभाव अब राजनयिकों के माध्यम से नहीं; बल्कि छात्रवृत्तियों, एन्क्रिप्टेड चैट और कट्टरपंथी युवा नेटवर्क के माध्यम से फैलता है।”

तुर्की का धीमा लेकिन जानबूझकर किया गया वैचारिक मोड़―जो कभी सूक्ष्म था, अब स्पष्ट है―पाकिस्तान के लंबे समय से चले आ रहे छद्म नेटवर्क और बांग्लादेश के भूमिगत इस्लामी संगठनों के साथ-साथ प्रभाव के एक समानांतर चैनल में विकसित हो गया है। एक बार की आतंकी साजिश के विपरीत, लाल किला मामले ने दो दशकों में धैर्यपूर्वक निर्मित एक संपूर्ण सीमा पार वैचारिक पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र का खुलासा किया, जिसमें तुर्की के सॉफ्ट-पावर संस्थान, पाकिस्तानी खुफिया एजेंसियां ​​और बांग्लादेश स्थित कट्टरपंथी नेटवर्क एक साथ जुड़े हुए थे, और ये सभी भारत के युवा स्थलों, विश्वविद्यालय परिसरों, धार्मिक मदरसों और डिजिटल समुदायों में समाहित हो गए। इस खोज ने कई भारतीयों को चौंका दिया, लेकिन सुरक्षा एजेंसियों के लिए, जो चुपचाप तुर्की के वैचारिक अतिक्रमण पर नज़र रख रही थीं, इसने केवल एक बढ़ते डर की पुष्टि की: अंकारा अब दक्षिण एशिया में एक पर्यवेक्षक नहीं रहा―वह एक अभिनेता बन रहा था।

एर्दोआन के अधीन तुर्की के परिवर्तन की जाँच किए बिना इस बदलाव को समझा नहीं जा सकता। कभी मुस्लिम जगत के लिए एक आदर्श धर्मनिरपेक्ष लोकतंत्र के रूप में प्रशंसित तुर्की में एक वैचारिक क्रांति आई जिसने इसे राजनीतिक इस्लाम का वैश्विक केंद्र बना दिया, जिसने मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड से प्रेरणा ली और खुद को दुनिया भर में मुस्लिम हितों के रक्षक के रूप में स्थापित किया। पिछले दस वर्षों में, इस वैचारिक राष्ट्रवाद के साथ रणनीतिक अवसरवाद भी जुड़ गया है―कश्मीर पर पाकिस्तान के आख्यानों का समर्थन, अंतर्राष्ट्रीय मंचों पर भारत-विरोधी बयानबाजी का नेतृत्व, भारत की कूटनीतिक पहलों में बाधा डालना, और दक्षिण एशिया में सांस्कृतिक, शैक्षिक और धार्मिक प्रभाव को आक्रामक रूप से बढ़ावा देना।

"जब विचारधारा विदेश नीति का औज़ार बन जाती है, तो विश्वविद्यालय युद्धक्षेत्र बन जाते हैं।"

अनुच्छेद 370 के निरस्त होने के बाद, एर्दोआन ने संयुक्त राष्ट्र महासभा में बार-बार पाकिस्तान के रुख़ को दोहराया और इस्लामाबाद की ही भाषा में भारत की आलोचना की। सैन्य सहयोग के ज़रिए यह गठबंधन और गहरा हुआ: तुर्की ने पाकिस्तान के युद्धपोतों का आधुनिकीकरण किया, उन्नत ड्रोन बेचे, पाकिस्तानी अधिकारियों को प्रशिक्षित किया और पश्चिमी राजनयिक हलकों में इस्लामाबाद के लॉबिंग अभियानों में भी मदद की। बदले में, पाकिस्तान ने तुर्की के सांस्कृतिक और वैचारिक प्रभाव को बढ़ाया; तुर्की के नाटकों, मौलवी नेटवर्क और डिजिटल अभियानों को पाकिस्तानी मीडिया चैनलों में उत्सुकता से बढ़ावा मिला। बांग्लादेश ने अपनी जटिलताएँ और बढ़ा दीं: हालाँकि सार्वजनिक रूप से तटस्थ, यूनुस शासन के तहत मज़बूत हुए इस्लामी समूहों ने पाकिस्तान के जमात-ए-इस्लामी के साथ दीर्घकालिक संबंध बनाए रखे और तुर्की के बढ़ते धार्मिक और विकास नेटवर्क में तेज़ी से शामिल होते गए। ये भारत-पाक-बांग्लादेश संबंध―जो ऐतिहासिक रूप से वैचारिक और अब संस्थागत हैं―ने तुर्की के भारतीय समाज में पैठ बनाने के लिए एक उपजाऊ माहौल तैयार किया।

हालाँकि, भारत से जुड़ने का सिलसिला आतंकवादी समूहों से नहीं, बल्कि छात्रवृत्तियों, सांस्कृतिक आदान-प्रदान, युवा संगठनों और धार्मिक संस्थाओं से शुरू हुआ, जिन्होंने खुद को सौम्य अंतरराष्ट्रीय जुड़ाव के रूप में प्रस्तुत किया। तुर्की की प्रमुख छात्रवृत्ति योजना, तुर्किये बर्सलारी, चुपचाप विदेशी वित्त पोषित सबसे बड़े शैक्षणिक चैनलों में से एक बन गई, जिसने भारतीय मुस्लिम छात्रों को आकर्षित किया, खासकर शहरी शैक्षणिक केंद्रों और परिसरों से जहाँ फ्रेटरनिटी मूवमेंट, एसआईओ से जुड़े समूह और स्वतंत्र मुस्लिम समूह जैसे संगठित छात्र संगठन फले-फूले। अकादमिक परिणामों पर केंद्रित पश्चिमी छात्रवृत्तियों के विपरीत, तुर्की छात्रवृत्तियों ने वैचारिक विसर्जन पर ज़ोर दिया―गहन तुर्की भाषा प्रशिक्षण, लंबे सांस्कृतिक मॉड्यूल, ब्रदरहुड से प्रेरित राजनीतिक व्याख्यान, और अपने कट्टरपंथी आख्यान लेकर चलने वाले पाकिस्तानी और बांग्लादेशी छात्रों के साथ निरंतर बातचीत। कई भारतीय छात्र पहचान की एक विशिष्ट राजनीतिक अवधारणा के साथ लौटे: तुर्की एक आध्यात्मिक मातृभूमि के रूप में, एर्दोआन एक प्रतीकात्मक नेता के रूप में, और भारत एक दमनकारी "बहुसंख्यकवादी" राज्य के रूप में―एक आख्यानात्मक ढाँचा जो तुर्की के राजनीतिक इस्लाम और पाकिस्तानी प्रचार को प्रतिबिंबित करता है। बर्सलारी के समानांतर, तुर्की दीयानेट फाउंडेशन (टीडीवी) ने दक्षिण एशियाई युवाओं के लिए धार्मिक शिक्षा प्रायोजित की, अंकारा और कोन्या में इमामों और धार्मिक विद्वानों को प्रशिक्षण दिया। इन कार्यक्रमों ने धर्मशास्त्र को राजनीतिक संदेश के साथ जोड़ा, और स्नातकों को तैयार किया जो बाद में भारत लौटकर प्रचारक, सामुदायिक आयोजक और सोशल मीडिया पर प्रभावशाली व्यक्ति बनकर स्थानीय मुस्लिम विमर्श को आकार देने लगे। समय के साथ, इसने अंकारा के विश्वदृष्टिकोण से गहराई से प्रभावित वैचारिक रूप से जुड़े व्यक्तियों का एक शांत दल तैयार किया।

"तुर्की ने वह कर दिखाया है जो पाकिस्तान दशकों से नहीं कर पाया: भावनात्मक वफ़ादारी को राजनीतिक प्रभाव में बदलना।"

छात्रवृत्ति के अलावा, तुर्की के युवा संगठनों ने कहीं ज़्यादा सक्रिय भूमिका निभाई। एर्दोआन के करीबी लोगों द्वारा संचालित और कई यूरोपीय ख़ुफ़िया रिपोर्टों में चरमपंथी विचारधारा के लिए चिह्नित, TUGVA ने दक्षिण एशियाई छात्रों को "मुस्लिम एकता", "प्रतिरोध" और "पहचान जुटाने" पर केंद्रित नेतृत्व शिविरों में आमंत्रित किया। प्रतिभागियों ने पाकिस्तान के इस्लामी जमीयत-ए-तलाबा और बांग्लादेश के इस्लामी छात्र शिबिर के कार्यकर्ताओं से मुलाकात की―जिन समूहों का राजनीतिक हिंसा का इतिहास दर्ज है। सीरिया में सशस्त्र नेटवर्कों से विवादास्पद रूप से जुड़ा ह्यूमैनिटेरियन रिलीफ़ फ़ाउंडेशन (IHH) ने भारत के PFI सहित दक्षिण एशियाई समूहों के साथ काम करते हुए, आउटरीच के एक और प्रवेश द्वार के रूप में काम किया, जैसा कि नॉर्डिक मॉनिटर ने बताया है। तुर्की की विकास एजेंसी, TIKA ने भी भारत के NGO क्षेत्र में चुपचाप प्रवेश करने का प्रयास किया, जो अफ्रीका और मध्य एशिया में उसके प्रभाव अभियानों की नकल करता है, जहाँ विकास परियोजनाएँ वैचारिक लाभ के रूप में दोगुनी हो गईं। पाकिस्तान और अफ़गानिस्तान में पहले से ही प्रभावशाली रहे मारिफ़ फ़ाउंडेशन स्कूलों ने भारत में विस्तार की योजना बनाई थी, लेकिन जाँच के कारण चुपचाप पीछे हट गए। फिर भी, दक्षिण एशिया को तुर्की से जोड़ने वाला सबसे विवेकशील और प्रभावशाली संस्थान IIFSO―इंटरनेशनल इस्लामिक फ़ेडरेशन ऑफ़ स्टूडेंट ऑर्गनाइज़ेशन्स―था, जो एक अंतरराष्ट्रीय संघ था जिसने भारतीय, पाकिस्तानी, बांग्लादेशी, मलेशियाई और तुर्की छात्र संगठनों को अंकारा स्थित एक छत्रछाया में एक साथ लाया। सम्मेलनों, नेतृत्व कार्यशालाओं और डिजिटल नेटवर्किंग के माध्यम से, IIFSO ने अंतरराष्ट्रीय वैचारिक सेतु बनाए जिससे भारत के परिसरों के छात्रों को दक्षिण एशिया के कट्टरपंथी संगठनों के कार्यकर्ताओं के साथ घुलने-मिलने का मौका मिला, जिससे अक्सर इस्लामी राजनीतिक पहचान और शिकायतों की भाषा सामान्य हो गई।

“विचारधाराओं को पासपोर्ट की ज़रूरत नहीं होती। उन्हें बस पहचान की तलाश में युवा दिमागों की ज़रूरत होती है।”

इस वैचारिक पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र ने भारतीय सुरक्षा एजेंसियों के लिए एक नई तरह की चुनौती पेश की। सिमी या पीएफआई के विपरीत, जो खुले तौर पर राज्य का सामना करते थे और स्पष्ट रूप से चरमपंथी प्रवृत्तियाँ प्रदर्शित करते थे, ये नए छात्र नेटवर्क कानूनी, शैक्षणिक, स्पष्टवादी और डिजिटल रूप से परिष्कृत प्रतीत हुए। वे संवैधानिक दायरे में काम करते थे और सार्वजनिक विमर्श को आकार देने के लिए लोकतांत्रिक साधनों―कैंपस की राजनीति, सोशल मीडिया पर सक्रियता, अकादमिक सेमिनार―का इस्तेमाल करते थे। तुर्की के वैचारिक मंचों से उनकी निकटता ने उन्हें अंतर्राष्ट्रीय सम्मेलनों, वैश्विक मुस्लिम युवा मंचों और तुर्की सांस्कृतिक संस्थानों तक पहुँच प्रदान की, जिससे वे सुसंगत, परिष्कृत आख्यान तैयार कर पाए जो अक्सर अंकारा के राजनीतिक संदेशों को प्रतिबिंबित करते थे: भारत एक बहुसंख्यकवादी राज्य के रूप में, तुर्की दुनिया में मुसलमानों का रक्षक, कश्मीर एक अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संघर्ष के रूप में, हिंदुत्व एक वैश्विक खतरा और मुस्लिम एकजुटता एक वैश्विक कर्तव्य के रूप में। ये आख्यान सीएए विरोधी प्रदर्शनों, एनआरसी आंदोलन, हिजाब विवाद और कई कैंपस-नेतृत्व वाले आंदोलनों के दौरान प्रमुखता से सामने आए―कभी छुपकर, कभी खुले तौर पर।

बांग्लादेश इस नेटवर्क को थामे रखने वाले तीसरे स्तंभ के रूप में काम करता था। इस्लामी छात्र शिबिर जैसे संगठनों ने पाकिस्तान के जमात नेटवर्क के साथ गुप्त संबंध बनाए रखे और जेएमबी के साथ परिचालन संबंध बनाए रखे, जिसने ऐतिहासिक रूप से भारत के अंदर, विशेष रूप से असम, पश्चिम बंगाल और बिहार में हमले किए हैं। जब आईसीएस नेता आईआईएफएसओ के कार्यक्रमों के लिए तुर्की गए, तो उन्होंने भारतीय छात्र कार्यकर्ताओं से मुलाकात की, जिससे ढाका, कराची और दिल्ली के बीच वैचारिक मतभेद पैदा हुए। हालाँकि बांग्लादेश सरकार ने जेएमबी और जमात नेटवर्क पर सार्वजनिक रूप से कार्रवाई की, फिर भी उनके छात्र संगठन कैंपस की राजनीति में गहराई से जुड़े रहे और अंतरराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर पहुँच बनाने के लिए वैचारिक केंद्रों के रूप में काम करते रहे। तुर्की के लिए, ये नेटवर्क भारत के पड़ोस में एक तैयार प्रवेश द्वार थे।

"यह एक नए प्रकार का घेराव है―क्षेत्रीय नहीं, बल्कि मनोवैज्ञानिक।"

परिणामस्वरूप एक ऐसा जटिल पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र विकसित हुआ जिसका मुकाबला पारंपरिक आतंकवाद-रोधी उपकरणों से नहीं किया जा सकता था। कट्टरपंथ अब केवल गुप्त कार्यकर्ताओं या मदरसा-आधारित विचारधारा पर निर्भर नहीं रहा; यह शैक्षणिक आदान-प्रदान, वैश्विक पहचान के आख्यानों, डिजिटल प्रचार और मानवाधिकारों व वैश्विक एकजुटता की भाषा में लिपटे छात्रवृत्ति कार्यक्रमों के माध्यम से फैला। जब तक भारत ने लाल किला विस्फोट में तुर्की के संबंध का खुलासा किया, तब तक इस तरह के प्रभाव को संभव बनाने वाली वैचारिक नींव वर्षों पहले ही चुपचाप रखी जा चुकी थी। इस प्रकार, भारत को तीन दिशाओं वाले खतरे का सामना करना पड़ रहा है: तुर्की का वैचारिक विस्तार, पाकिस्तान के खुफिया अभियान और बांग्लादेश के कट्टरपंथी नेटवर्क―जो आवश्यक रूप से औपचारिक समझौतों के माध्यम से नहीं, बल्कि साझा विश्वदृष्टि, अतिव्यापी मंचों और वैचारिक समन्वय के माध्यम से संरेखित हैं। युद्ध का मैदान सीमाओं से हटकर परिसरों में, सुरक्षित ठिकानों से व्हाट्सएप समूहों में, कट्टरपंथी प्रचारकों से छात्रवृत्ति ब्रोशर तक स्थानांतरित हो गया है। अगर भारत इस उभरते हुए पारिस्थितिकी तंत्र का मुकाबला करना चाहता है, तो उसे संवैधानिक स्वतंत्रता से समझौता किए बिना, प्रति-आख्यान गढ़ने होंगे, विदेशी वित्तपोषित शैक्षिक चैनलों की जाँच करनी होगी, युवाओं की भागीदारी को मज़बूत करना होगा और परिसरों में पहुँच की रणनीतियों में सुधार करना होगा। यह ख़तरा वैचारिक, विकेंद्रीकृत और पीढ़ीगत है―ऐसा ख़तरा जिसके लिए सुरक्षा हस्तक्षेप के साथ-साथ बौद्धिक सतर्कता भी ज़रूरी है। आज इसे नज़रअंदाज़ करने का मतलब है कल एक कहीं ज़्यादा गहरे संकट का सामना करना, जो सिर्फ़ बमों या गोलियों से नहीं, बल्कि कहीं और गढ़े गए दिमागों से प्रेरित होगा, जो अंकारा में गढ़े गए आख्यानों के प्रति वफ़ादार होंगे, और भारत की सीमाओं से बहुत दूर भू-राजनीतिक एजेंडों से जुड़े होंगे।

भारत ने तुर्की से बेहतर द्विपक्षीय संबंधों की माँग की; तुर्की ने एन्क्रिप्टेड संदेश भेजकर जवाब दिया। वाकई दिल को छू लेने वाला.!!!

References

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